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TRADING IN COMMODITY FUTURES-A NEW
STANDARD OF LEGALITY?
TELFORD TAYLORt
DURING the early months of 1924 the Uhlmann Grain Company, a large
grain brokerage establishment, opened a branch office in the town of
Carrollton, Missouri.' One E. S. McDonough, who had been hired by
the Company to open and take charge of this branch, proceeded to
Carrollton and took office space in the basement of the Flowers Hotel.
He equipped his headquarters with a table for telegraph instruments, a
large blackboard on which to mark up grain quotations of the principal
mid-western exchanges, chairs for the benefit of clients and potential
clients who might be interested in the course of events indicated by the
blackboard, and, for his own use, a roll-top desk and a typewriter.
The Uhlmann Company then leased from the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company a private wire connecting the Carrollton branch
with a larger office of the Company in Kansas City, Missouri, over
which the Kansas City office relayed to Carrollton the grain quotations.
Carrollton, a town with a population of about 3200 people, is situated
in a grain farming area. Most of the inhabitants gain their living as
farmers or small tradesmen. In this probably not too sophisticated
vicinage McDonough started to build himself a clientele by soliciting the
citizens to augment their incomes through speculation in grain futures.
He found willing listeners, to whom he revealed something of the nature
of grain speculation and the then existing "spread" in prices between
Winnipeg and Chicago. This "spread," he explained, presented a golden
opportunity for making "some easy money" by buying on one exchange
and selling on the other.
Some fifty people thought this an attractive scheme, and accordingly
empowered McDonough to deal in grain futures on their account. Some
of them put up cash margins, some gave notes, some were accommodated
on no margin at all. Some of them were reasonably weli-to-do, but at
least one of them McDonough knew to be already heavily obligated to
the local bank. Various occupations were represented, the customers
including in their number farmers and farmers' wives, a real estate man,
a printer, a coal-dealer, a physician, a laundryman and his wife, an
tAssistant Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior. See the author's article,
with Everett I. Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1169.
1. The ensuing statement of facts is taken from the Transcript of Record, Dickson v.
Uhnlmann Grain Co., 288 U. S. 188 (1933).
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undertaker, an insurance agent, a clothing merchant, and the proprietor
of a country store. Many seem to have left all control over the opera-
tions to McDonough. Initial losses aroused some apprehension, but
McDonough assured them that this was but a temporary fluctuation,
and that eventually "we were bound to win and make a potfull of
money." The losses continued, and the Uhlmann Company sent the
customers letters of consolation ending on a note of hope. Anxious to
recoup their losses, several customers went to Chicago to see if Mr. Fred
Uhlmann, the president of the Company, would consent to accept their
notes and keep them in the market. They succeeded in their purpose,
and received fresh assurances that things must soon change for the
better. But the hoped-for swing in the market did not materialize,
and in November the Company closed out the Carrollton accounts, ap-
propriated the margins, and paid such losses as the margins would not
cover. It then discontinued the Carrollton branch, and McDonough
moved away, leaving forty-six people indebted to the Company in the
sum of $63,891.88, which represented money advanced by the Uhlmann
Company to pay the Carrollton losses, and a commission of one quarter
of a cent per bushel dealt in on the exchange.
The result of these transactions, unexpected and disillusioning as it
was, aroused sufficient resentment against the Uhlmann Grain Company
to make difficult the collection of its Carrollton claims. On December
12, 1924, the Company brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri against the five largest debtors. 2
The case was defended on the ground that the debts arose out of
gambling transactions, and were illegal and unenforceable under the
statutes of Missouri. After repeated postponements a consolidated
trial was finally had before District Judge Reeves, who entered judgment
for the defendants on March 8, 1929.3 Almost three years later this
judgment was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.4 On February 6, 1933, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, reversed the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, and held the transactions invalid under the
laws of Missouri.5 Mr. Justice Butler filed a dissenting opinion, which
was concurred in by Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo.
2. Some of the smaller debtors were sued in the state courts.
3. Uhlmann Grain Co. v. Dickson (W. D. Mo. 1929) (unreported).
4. Uhlmann Grain Co. v. Dickson, 56 F. (2d) 525 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932). The opinion of
the court was written by Judge Gardner. Judge Van Valkenburgh filed a concurring
opinion. The late Judge Kenyon dissented.
5. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 1. The case is noted in (1933) 81 U. or
PA. L. REv. 881.
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The Relation of the "Intent Test" to Future Trading on Exchanges
No one who is acquainted with the origin and development of the
judicial attitude toward speculation in commodities can escape the con-
clusion that the courts have signally failed to cope adequately with the
problems involved.6 Speculative contracts in the form in which they are
now cast were first sought to be enforced just after 1850. Not long
before this time the attitude of judges and legislators toward wager
contracts in general had changed from one of suspicious and hesitant
tolerance to one of active condemnation.' But the forms of contract
used by speculators in stocks or produce did not prove amenable to
the application of such rules as had been devised for determining
whether or not a contract was a wager; 8 on their face these contracts
simply purported to represent agreements for the purchase or sale of a
given amount of unspecified stock or commodities to be delivered and
paid for at a future date.' If such a contract meant what' it said, there
6. Cf. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges (1931) 40 Y= L. J.
843; Legis. (1932) 45 HARv. L. RFv. 912.
7. The mere fact that a contract was a wager did not make it unenforceable at common
law. Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp. 37 (1774); see 3 WiLmsroN, CONTRACTs (1920) § 1667.
But the courts would not enforce wagers the subject-matter of which was contra bonos
mores. Da Costa v. Jones, 2 Cowp. 729 (1778); see Eltham v. Kingsman, 1 B. & Aid. 683,
637 (1813); 3 WMLrsToN, CONTRACTS § 1667. In England the statute of 8 & 9 VICT. c. 109,
§ 18 (1845) made all wagers unenforceable. Hampden v. Walsh, 1 Q. B. D. 189 (1876).
A few early American cases enforced or recognized the validity of wager contracts. Morgan
v. Pettit, 4 Ill. 529 (1842); Smith v. Smith, 21 Ill. 244 (1859); Waddle v. Loper, 1 Mo.
636 (1826); Walker v. Armstrong, 54 Tex. 609 (1881); cf. Ridgely v. Riggs, 4 Harr. & J.
358 (Md. 1818) ; Gilchreest v. Pollock, 2 Yeates 18 (Pa. 1795). And occasionally an American
court has refused to enforce a wager solely on the ground that the particular subject-matter
was opposed to public policy. Bunn v. Riker, 4 Johns 426 (N. Y. 1809); Hickerson v.
Benson, 8 Mo. 8 (1843); cf. Harding v. Walker, Fed. Cas. No. 6,050a (Terr. Ark. 1828).
But generally in the United States, either by statute or at common law, wagers have been
not only unenforceable but illegal and void. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499 (1884); Water-
man v. Buckand, 1 Mo. App. 45 (1876); see 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1668.
8. The orthodox test of a wager has been thus stated in the REsrArTznm or THE LAW
or CoNTRACrS (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 520: "A bargain in which a promisor undertakes that,
upon the existence or happening of a condition he will render a performance (a) for which
there is no agreed exchange, and (b) which does not indemnify or exonerate the promisee
or a beneficiary of the bargain for a loss caused by the existence or happening of the
condition is a wager and is illegal" Cf. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law
of Contracts (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 32. A contract for the future sale and purchase
of commodities would not on its face be a wager, so the courts were faced with the
additional problem of determining what the contract was. This additional problem led to
the establishment of the "intent test."
9. This is the form in which future dealings on commodity exchanges are always carried
on. From future contracts of this type should be sharply differentiated "sales to arrive"
and "sales for deferred delivery," which are present sales of specified goods. Future con-
tracts on exchanges are always contracts for the sale of unspecified goods, and generally
can be fulfilled by the delivery of any one of a number of different grades at the option
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was no question about its validity, ° but it was perfectly obvious that
the parties could, by waiving delivery and settling on the basis of the
difference between the price stipulated in the contract and the market
price at the time delivery came due, disguise a wager on the course of
market prices behind a contract innocent upon its face." It must have
been such reasoning which led the Court of Common Pleas in 1852
to establish the test of "intent of the parties to deliver" as determina-
tive of the validity of a future contract. 2  As later stated by Mr. Justice
Matthews,
" . . . a contract for the sale of goods to be delivered at a future day is
of the seller. A stipulated scale of relative values for the different grades serves as the
basis of settlement if delivery is actually made. Cf. Legis. (1932) 45 HAv. L. REv. 912, n. 2.
10. It was at one time doubted in England whether a sale of unspecified goods for future
delivery was valid if the seller neither owned such goods at the time of contracting nor had
any means of fulfilling the contract except by purchase from a third party. See Lorymer
v. Smith, 1 B. & C. 1, 3 (1822); Bryan v. Lewis, Ryan & Moody 386 (1826). But it was
finally held that future sales would not be declared invalid for this reason. Hibblewhite
v. M'Morine, 5 M. & W. 462 (1839). An American court had already come to the same
conclusion. Dodge v. Van Lear, Fed. Cas. No. 3,956 (D. C. 1837); cf. Gilchreest v. Pol-
lock, supra note 7. American courts have always followed the Hibblewhite case, except in
Georgia, where the seller's lack of ownership at the time of contracting was at first held
fatal. Warren, Lane & Co. v. Hewitt, 45 Ga. 501 (1872); Thompson Brothers v. Cummings
& Co., 68 Ga. 124 (1881). But Georgia now follows the orthodox rule. Forsyth Manu-
facturing Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 37 S. E. 485 (1900).
11. It may be well to note here a distinction which the courts have sometimes attempted
to draw between "speculation" and "gambling." It is obvious that people may and do
seek to profit by fluctuations in price even where actual transfers of property are involved.
It is onl; necessary to mention speculation by outright purchase of stock as distinguished
from margin transactions, or speculation in real estate. The buyer may have no use
for the property whatsoever, and his only interest in it may be the interest he would have
in any property which he might sell for more than he would have to pay. Why are such
transactions any the less "gambling" than ordinary bets? The only obvious difference is
that in the former case the method of gambling employed necessitates putting up enough
capital to acquire title to the property in the price fluctuations of which the gambling is
being carried on. In the case of a mere bet the only capital required is that with which
to pay the wager. It is clear that this is a real distinction, insofar as the necessity for
actual transfers of property operates to restrict speculation to people who are financially
responsible, and insofar as the actual purchases and sales help to stabilize and render
liquid the market. And the orthodox test of a wager is satisfied, since, however little use
the purchaser may have for the property intrinsically, he dearly has a legal "interest" in
it, and is not required to render a performance to the other party to the contract for which
there is no agreed exchange. At all events, the courts have sometimes suggested this to be
the line between "legitimate speculation" and "mere gambling." The central issue in de-
termining the legality of future contracts, as will presently be more fully explained, is
whether speculation by trading in contract rights to goods is to be regarded as trading in
goods themselves, or whether the mere contract interest, which the holder may or may not
intend to perfect into a property interest, is insufficient to avoid the wager classification.
See pp. 89-90, infra.
12. Grizewood v. Blane, 11 C. B. 526 (1852). This appears to be the first decision
recognizing the "intent test."
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valid . . . when the parties really intend and agree that the goods are to be
delivered by the seller and the price to be paid by the buyer; and, if under
guise of such a contract, the real intent be meiely to speculate in the rise
and fall of prices, and the goods are not to be delivered, but one party is to pay
to the other the difference between the contract price and the market price of
the goods at the date fixed for executing the contract, then the whole transac-
tion constitutes nothing more than a wager, and is null and void." 13
Possibly no rule of law has ever met with such immediate and
unanimous approval as did the "intent test." Common law courts with-
out exception have always declared it to be the true and only criterion
of the validity of future contracts,' 4 and it has been written into the
statute law of almost every state." Yet the test, logical as it was in its
origin, and simple to apply in cases where but two parties are involved,
has proved totally inadequate in its application to speculation as it is
now managed on the floors of the great exchanges. The confusion and
13. Irwin v. Williar, supra note 7, at 508-09.
14. The Grizewood case was approved in Barry v. Croskey, 2 J. & H. 1 (1861); and
the rule that it established has been adopted by the House of Lords. Universal Stock
Exchange v. Strachan, [1896) A. C. 166. American courts adopted the "intent test" from
the outset. Irwin v. Williar, supra note 7; In re Chandler, Fed. Cas. No. 2,590 (N. D. Ill.
1874); In re Green, Fed. Cas. No. 5,751 (W. D. Wis. 1877); Justh v. Holliday, 2 Mackey
346 (D. C. 1883) (the loser in this case was General Custer of Indian fame); Pickering
v. Cease, 79 Ill. 328 (1875); Rumsey v. Berry, 65 Me. 570 (1876); Gregory v. Wendell, 39
Mich. 337 (1878); Williams v. Tiedeman, 6 Mo. App. 269 (1878); Cassard v. Hinman,
1 Bosw. 207 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1857); Yerkes v. Salomon, 11 Hun 471 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1877); Brua's Appeal, 55 Pa. 294 (1867); Marshall v. Thruston, 3 Lea 740 (Tenn. 1879);
Noyes v. Spaulding, 27 Vt. 420 (1855); Barnard v. Backhaus, 52 Wis. 593 (1881). Noyes
v. Spaulding and Cassard v. Hinman, both supra, seem to be the only decisions preceding
those which arose from the outburst of speculative activity during and following the Civil
War. See GOLDSTEIN, MARKETING: A FARMERS PROBLEMf (1928) 124, n. 467. The "intent
test" would have been robbed of all effect if it had been held, as did one early case, that the
parol evidence rule prevents the introduction of parol evidence to prove the illegal intent
of parties to a written contract fair on its face. Porter v. Viets, Fed. Cas. No. 11,291 (C. C.
N. D. I1. 1857). But this case has never been followed, and it is now universally held that the
mere language and form of the contract do not govern if the illegal intent in fact exists.
Irwin v. Williar, supra note 7.
15. The statutes are collected and analyzed in Legis. (1932) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 912. On
the question whether the Cotton Futures Act, 39 STAT. 476 (1916), 26 U. S. C. § § 731-52
(1926) or the Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § § 1-17 (1926) abro-
gate or modify the "intent test" see pp. 94-102, in! ra. Six southern states have recently
adopted statutes which are apparently designed to legitimatize all trading on established ex-
changes. See Legis. (1932) 45 HAxv. L. REv. 912, 920; cf. Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. Ray.
638, 641. But the phraseology of these statutes offers loop-holes through which a discern-
ing court can profess to see a purpose not to alter the "intent test." Cf. Legis. (1932) 45
HARv. L. REv. 912, 920. The Mississippi court has already shown itself to be discerning and
has robbed the statutes of all force. Alamaris v. Jno. F. Clark & Co., 145 So. 893 (Miss.
1933). See also Hutchinson v. Brown, 169 S. E. 848 (Ga. App. 1933). The Texas courts
are in conflict upon the effect of the statute. See Erwin v. White, 54 S. W. (2d) 867 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932); Morgan v. Rose, 62 S. W. (2d) 1022 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
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uncertainty which have resulted have been largely due to the failure of
the courts to recognize th.t future contracts on exchanges imperatively
demand the development of rules ancillary to the "intent test"; their
determination to find in it unadorned a complete answer to all possible
situations has involved them in a maze of fictions, and has frequently
forced them to close their eyes to facts obviously destructive of their
premises of decision.16
A brief description of the nature of exchange dealings will make this
clear." Let us take the case of one of the Carrolton defendants who
authorized McDonough to purchase for him 5000 bushels of November
wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade. McDonough wired the order to
the Kansas City office, which relayed it to the principal office of the
Uhlmann Company in Chicago. A representative of the Company then
went on the floor of the Board of Trade, of which the Uhlmann Company
is a member, and purchased the wheat at the market price from some
other broker or brokers. The selling broker did not know or care
whether the Uhlmann Company was dealing on its own account or for
a principal, and the Uhlmann Company shared his indifference in this
particular, for a rule of the exchange required all brokers to contract on
the floor as principals.'" The brokers exchanged slips as memorials of
the trade, and, after the Board had closed for the day, the Uhlmann
Company and the selling broker sent confirmations to each other. The
Uhlmann Company and all other brokers likewise sent reports of all
their day's trading to the clearing-house, which then assumed the obliga-
tions that other brokers had assumed to the Uhlmann Company and
the Uhlman Company's obligations to other brokers. Thus at the end
of the day the individuality of parties to the contracts made in the pit
was lost, and the clearing-house stood as seller to all parties who had
bought, and as buyer to all parties who had sold. The Uhlmann Com-
pany, as a large brokerage house, doubtless had executed many orders
for purchase and sale of November wheat, of which the Carrollton
order was one. If all the orders for purchase of November wheat ex-
X6. Cf. Note (1927) 40 HAv. L. REV. 638, 639. Examples of this attitude are the cases
holding that the great proportion of trades on exchanges which are settled without delivery
is not evidence of the intent of the particular parties. See, e.g., Roundtree v. Smith, 108
U. S. 269, 276 (1883). Compare also the Illinois cases holding that a broker "wins" when a
customer "loses" despite clear evidence that, since the broker merely executed the client's
contracts on the exchange, he could not possibly have "won." Pearce v. Foote, 113 Ill.
228 (1885); Kruse v. Kennett, 181 IM. 199, 54 N. E. 965 (1899).
17. Excellent treatises on this general subject are BAER AND WOODRUFF, COMODiTy EX-
CHAaNrEs (1929); EmERY, SPECULATION ON TE Srocx AND PRODUCE ExcHA1ors oF THE
UNITED STATES (1896); Hornmr, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COmZmoDITY MARcETS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1932). See also (1931) 155 AN. Amr. ACAD. passim.
18. (1924) RULEs OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE Crr o CHICAGO, Rule XIV, § 1,
Rule XXII, § 11.
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ceeded the orders of sale, the clearing-house would notify the Uhlmann
Company that it was "long" on November wheat to the extent that
purchases exceeded sales. This same proceeding was gone through at
the end of every day of trading, until the final day upon which delivery
of November wheat could be made. As the orders fluctuated from
day to day, the Uhlmann Company might be alternately "long" and
"short" on wheat. But, as the end of November drew near, the Carroll-
ton purchaser and other customers of the Company who did not care
to deliver or receive actual wheat "closed out" their deals, i.e. the
Carrollton purchaser sold 5000 bushels of November wheat, and,
similarly, the other customers sent in selling orders equivalent in amount
to their previous buying orders and vice-versa. If all the Uhlmann
Company's customers closed out, the Company would be left neither
"long" nor "short" with the clearing-house, and no wheat would be
delivered on any of the contracts. If any customer had actually wanted
to receive wheat, he would not have closed out, and the Company would
have been left to that extent "long" with the clearing-house, which
would have made actual delivery. 19
In the case of the Carrollton purchaser, wheat was at a lower price
when he closed out than when he bought, and hence he lost the dif-
ference. That same amount was lost by the Uhlmann Company to the
clearing-house, and, since the Company had contracted on the Board as
principal, it had to pay that loss. ° It was to protect itself against such
forced payments that the Company had required a margin of its clients,
and against these payments the margin was applied.21 The amount by
19. Similarly, a customer with actual wheat to deliver would not close out his selling
order, and he would make delivery through his broker to the clearing-house. As a matter
of fact wheat is very seldom delivered under future contracts on exchanges. Less than
0.6% of the May, 1924, wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade were fulfilled by
delivery. (1924) REP. GRAm FUTURES AD -NSmATnON 46. Actual wheat is for the most
part dealt in on the "cash grain" market, where it is bought and sold in specified lots.
It will be observed that the clearing-house operates as a bookkeeping device to enable
brokers and their clients to liquidate their contracts with facility. Before the advent of
the clearing-house the same result was obtained in a rather more cumbersome way through
the use of "set-offs" and "rings." An example of the use of the former device may be
found in the situation where A has sold a given quantity of grain to B, and B has later
sold the same amount to A. The cross-transactions cancel, and no delivery is necessary.
A "ring" is the slightly more complicated device used where A has sold to B, B to C, C to
D, and D to A. Since the wheat would simply travel the circle from A and back to A,
all the trades can be cancelled and settled on differences. Brokers formerly closed out their
transactions by forming "rings" or negotiating "set-off" contracts on the floor. The
clearing-house obviates the difficulties attendant on these proceedings.
20. Clearing-houses exact margins from the brokers, just as do the brokers from their
clients.
21. The margin put up by the customer serves the added function of providing funds




which the Company's payments to the clearing-house on account of the
Carrollton trades exceeded margins received in Carrollton, plus a commis-
sion, was the sum for which the Company sued the Carrollton
defendants.
It should now be plain that the test of "intent of the parties to deliver
and receive" requires some elaboration and definition of terms before it
can be satisfactorily used to determine the legality of the transactions
just described. In the first place, who are "the parties" whose intent
is to be considered relevant? Certainly at first, and doubtless ever
since in theory, the courts have looked to the intent of the principal
parties to the contract-the responsible buyer and seller. But who
were the principals in the Carrollton transactions? Clearly the defend-
ants were principals, and it may be assumed for the moment that they
did not intend to deliver or receive, but the law requires that both
parties to the contract shall share the evil intent in order to invalidate
the contract." The Uthlmann Company was not the other principal, for
it was acting as broker.23 The other principals were, then, at first the
clients of the brokers with whom the Uhlmann Company had dealt on
the Exchange, and, subsequently, the clearing-house. Should the Car-
rollton defendants have shown the intent of these other clients of
brokers, of the clearing-house, or both? If the original sellers to the
Carrollton buyers had not intended to deliver, would the contract be
purged when adopted by the clearing-house with legal intent? And
would a contract valid in origin be tainted when assumed by a clearing-
house having an illegal intent? 24
22. The rule is always so stated. See 3 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1670; RESTATE-
IfENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 523. In the absence of statute
it is universally held that the evil intent of one party, when unknown to the other, will not
invalidate the contract. Roundtree v. Smith, supra note 16; Browne v. Thorne, 260 U. S.
137 (1922); Clarke v. Foss, Fed. Cas. No. 2852 (W. D. Wis. 1878); Edwards v. Hoeffing-
hoff, 38 Fed. 635 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1889); Flowers v. Bush & Witherspoon Co., 254 Fed.
519 (C. C. A. Sth, 1918); Jacobs v. Hyman, 286 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Griffin v.
Payne, 24 P. (2d) 370 (Cal. App. 1933); Scanlon v. Warren, 169 Ill. 142, 48 N. E. 410
(1897); Pixley v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 351 (1875); Quinn Smith Co. v. Litvin, 24 P. (2d) 425
(Wash. 1933). But it has been held in this situation that the party who intended not
to deliver or receive cannot enforce the contract. Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671 (1336).
23. This is true despite the fact that a broker contracts as principal on the exchange, for
he is on the same side of the contract with his principal, i.e. he buys when the principal
buys, and vice-versa. The rule should, logically, look to the buying and selling principals.
As to the clients, the brokers are agents; as to each other, they are principals. Wilhite v.
Houston, 200 Fed. 390 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); Scandinavian Import-Export Co. v. Bachman,
195 App. Div. 297, 186 N. Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dep't 1921).
24. It has been held that a contract which is valid in origin does not become invalid if
the parties subsequently agree to settle on differences. Sprunt v. Hurst-Streator Co., 180
Fed. 782 (C. C. D. S. C. 1910); Nash-Wright Co. v. Wright, 156 Ill. App. 243 (1910); see
3 WuSTON, CoNTRACTs § 1674. Possibly a contract originally invalid may be validated if
the parties later agree actually to deliver and receive. Ibid. It has been so held in
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This problem caused the courts no little difficulty when they were first
confronted with the task of applying the "intent test" to exchange deal-
ings. For almost all of the litigation which has taken place has been
between customer and broker, with the customer attempting to establish
the illegality of the dealings, 25 and usually the customer has made no
effort to show the intent of the party with whom his broker dealt on
the exchange or of any assignee of such a party. Consequently, for over
a decade after 1875 the lower federal courts were deciding cases against
the customer on the ground that there was no evidence of illegal intent
on the part of the other principal to the contract.26 The Supreme Court
so held the first time it encountered a suit on a speculative contract.
The Missouri courts espoused this attitude so enthusiastically and con-
sistently 28 as to elicit from the state legislature a most stringent anti-
gambling statute, 9 the operation of which will later be dealt with in
some detail2 °  And in England it has always been held that the failure
of the customer to show the intent of the party with whom his broker
Pennsylvania. Anthony v. Unangst, 174 Pa. 10, 34 Atl. 284 (1896). But whether these
rules should be applied where the contract is assigned is at best doubtful. There is a total
absence of authority. Under the doctrine ultimately applied by the courts to exchange
transactions, the question has become unimportant. See p. 72, infra.
25. The commonest type of litigation is that represented by the Uhlmnann case, i.e. a
suit by a broker to recover advances and commissions from a customer. Under some
state statutes there has been considerable litigation instigated by customers to recover
margins applied by brokers to losses on the exchange. In either case the customer is
attempting to establish illegality. In two cases where the customer sued to recover profits
made on the exchange, it was held that the broker could not set up illegality as a defense.
Forster v. Hill, 215 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); Norton v. Blinn, 39 Ohio St. 145 (1883).
But cf. Morris v. Morton, 75 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) (opinion by Judge Taft). Liti-
gation involving the principals on both sides of an exchange contract has been extremely
rare, as have also suits on future contracts made outside the exchange. See notes 41 and 44,
infra.
26. Clarke v. Foss, supra note 22 (affirmed by the Circuit Court in an unreported
decision by Judge Duncan); Gilbert v. Gaugar, Fed. Cas. No. 5,412 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1878);
Lehman v. Strassberger, Fed. Cas. No. 8,216 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1875); Kirkpatrick v.
Adams, 20 Fed. 287 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1884); Hentz v. Jewell, 20 Fed. 592 (C. C. S. D.
Miss. 1881); Bennett v. Covington, 22 Fed. 816 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1884); Bangs v. Hor-
nick, 30 Fed. 97 (C. C. D. Minn. 1887); Ward v. Vosburgh, 31 Fed. 12 (C. C. E. D. Wis.
1887).
27. Roundtree v. Smith, supra note 16.
28. Cockrell v. Thompson, 85 Mo. 510 (1885); Kent v. Miltenberger, 13 Mo. App. 503
(1883); Teasdale v. McPike, 25 Mo. App. 341 (1887); Taylor v. Penquito, 35 Mo. App.
389 (1889). This view is apparently not yet quite dead in Missouri. Cf. Gordon v.
Andrews, 222 Mo. App. 609, 617, 2 S. W. (2d) 809, 814 (1927). An early North Carolina
case is to the same effect. Williams, Black & Co. v. Carr, 80 N. C. 295 (1878).
29. This statute, passed in 1889, now appears in Mo. Rtv. STAT. (1929) § § 4324-29. It
renders a future contract void if either party thereto intends neither to receive nor to de-
liver. Connor v. Black, 132 Mo. 150, 33 S. W. 783 (1896).
30. See pp. 85-87, infra.
19331
YALE LAW JOURNAL
dealt is fatal to his plea of illegality,3 and, in consequence, it may be
said that there the customer cannot, as a practical matter, set up
illegality as a defense to an action against him by his broker.3
In the United States, however, this view has been completely
abandoned, and it is now universally held that if the broker shares or
merely knows of the intent of his customer to settle on differences, the
contract as between them is invalidY The theories upon which this rule
has been based are diverse and not always satisfactory,34 but certainly
31. Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. 685 (1878); Forget v. Ostigny, [1395) A. C. 313;
Weddle, Beck & Co. v. Hackett, [19291 1 K. B. 321. The language of these cases is
occasionally confused, and it has been thought that they rest on the basis that, in
England, wagering contracts are only unenforceable, and not illegal, and that therefore
the broker can recover on his contract of employment with his client. See Harvey
v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1, 9-10, 22 N. E. 49, 51 (1889). Some support for this distinction
is found in the opinion of Lindley, J., who presided at the trial in Thacker v. Hardy,
supra. But that this can hardly be considered the true basis of the English rule is clear
from the opinions delivered in the Court of Appeal in the Thacker case, and that of
Swift, J., in Weddle, Beck & Co. v. Hackett, supra. The ground of these decisions is
rather that, since the party with whom the broker deals on the exchange was not shown
to have had any illegal intent, the contract made by the broker for the customer
must be valid, and that therefore no agreement between the broker and the customer that
the former would so deal as never to require the latter to take delivery could impair the
broker's right of indemnity on the exchange contract.
32. But in litigation between principals the English courts will not enforce contracts
where mutual illegal intent is shown. Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan, supra note 14.
33. Pearce v. Rice, 142 U. S. 28 (1891); Springs & Co. v. Carpenter, 154 Fed. 487 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1907); Parker v. Moore, 115 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902); James v. Haven &
Clement, 185 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911); Williamson v. Majors, 169 Fed. 754 (C. C. A.
5th, 1909), cert. den., 215 U. S. 597 (1909); Andrews v. George M. Shutt & Co., 44 F.
(2d) 337 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Bailey & Graham v. Phillips, 159 Fed. 535 (C. C. S. D.
Ga. 1907); Waldron v. Johnston, 86 Fed. 757 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1898); Parker v. Moore, 125
Fed. 807 (C. C. D. S. C. 1903); Cobb v. Prell, 15 Fed. 774 (C. C. D. Kan. 1883); Riordon
v. McCabe, 341 Ill. 506, 173 N. E. 660 (1930); Pardridge v. Cutler, 168 Ill. 504, 48 N. E.
125 (1897); Jamieson v. Wallace, 167 IDl. 388, 47 N. E. 762 (1897); S. M. Weld & Co. v.
Austin, 107 Miss. 279, 65 So. 247 (1914); Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Pa. 89 (1879); see Lamson
Brothers & Co. v. Turner, 277 Fed. 680, 684 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Gettys v. Newburger,
272 Fed. 209, 221 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); J. E. Hood & Co. v. McCune, 235 S. W. 158, 160
(Mo. App. 1921); cf. Lehman v. Feld, 37 Fed. 852 (C. C. S. D. Miss. 1889).
34. The later cases make no attempt at a theoretical justification of their position, but
simply assume that the intent of the broker and his customer controls. A few cases have
found or assumed that the other principal on the exchange intended no delivery, and have
denied the broker relief on the ground that he knowingly executed an illegal contract. Irwin
v. Williar, supra note 7; Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336 (1889); Metropolitan National
Bank v. Jansen, 108 Fed. 572 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); In re Green, supra note 14; Pope v.
Hanke, 155 I1. 617 (1894). Other cases have found that, whatever might have been the
intent of the party with whom the broker dealt, the broker agreed to see that his customer
would not be required to deliver or receive, and have therefore held or implied that the
broker in fact dealt with his customer as a principal. Pearce v. Rice; supra note 33; Alex
Hyman & Co. v. Hay, 277 Fed. 898 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); Ware v. Pearsons, 173 Fed. 878
(C. C. A. 8th, 1909); Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219 (1884); Harvey v. Merrill, supra
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no one can question the necessity of the conclusion if the "intent" rule
is to be retained. The endless legal complications which would attend
a serious effort to apply the "mutual intent test" to contracts which are
assigned freely between a multitude of parties on the exchange, the
disappearance of any consensual element whatsoever between the initial
principals, and the enormous difficulties of proving the intent of a
principal whose identity alone is difficult of discovery, all contribute to
the intrinsic absurdity of requiring that the intent of both (or all)
principals be shown. The truth of the matter is that the modern grain
speculator, if'he may be called a wagerer, has ceased to bet against any-
one in particular. The other principal completely loses his identity.
Any practicable rule must therefore be framed in terms of the two
parties who actually deal together-the broker and his customer.
But while the American courts may be said to have dealt satisfactorily
with the problem of defining "the parties" whose intent is to be con-
sidered material, they have been far from successful in developing any
intelligible concept of "intent to deliver," and their confusion in this
particular has resulted in the woeful uncertainty which characterizes
their disposition of speculation cases. 3 This uncertainty. arises out of
a failure to distinguish between making a contract with the intent and
understanding that its terms requiring delivery are fictitious and not to
be observed, and, on the other hand, an intent to assign the contract, so
that the assignor will not be required to deliver or receive, or an intent
to make a second contract which may be set off against the first so that
delivery will be unnecessary under either contract. The vast majority
of exchange transactions are entered into with an absolutely uniform
and easily definable intent. The parties intend at the outset to make
note 31; see Thompson v. Williamson, 67 N. J. Eq. 212, 219, 58 At. 602, 605 (1904).
The likelihood that in these cases the "agreement" amounted to anything more than a
statement by the broker to the customer that the latter, by setting off counter-transactions,
could avoid delivery, is very slight. See p. 74, infra. Possibly the most logical justification
of the rule as now applied is in the cases where the court finds that the customer authorized
the broker to make only a gambling contract. On such a finding, recovery may be denied
the broker on the theory that a valid contract would be unauthorized. Phelps v. Holder-
ness, 56 Ark. 300, 19 S. W. 921 (1892); Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498, 4 S. W. 713
(1887); Hill v. Johnson, 38 Mo. App. 383 (1889); David Dows, Jr. & Co. v. Glaspel, 4 N.
D. 251, 60 N. W. 60 (1894). But the factual likelihood of such a limited authority is scanty.
Apparently it is the rule in Georgia that the "mutual intent" need not be on both sides of
the contract, but only mutual to the parties beween whom litigation arises. Hutchinson v.
Brown, supra note 15.
35. This uncertainty has led many brokerage houses to adopt the policy of writing off
as uncollectible debts claims for commissions and advances which customers refuse to pay,
and to make no effort to collect through litigation. The difficulty of collection, of course,
tends to foster strict margin requirements, and to reduce greatly the amount of business
done on credit. This result is probably salutary, insofar as the customers usually are
allowed to use only what money they have, and are given less opportunity to lose money
they do not have.
19s33
YALE LAW JOURNAL
a contract which, standing alone, unqualifiedly requires that delivery of
the subject-matter be made. And each party agrees that, if he neither
assigns that contract nor enters into a counter-transaction, he will be
required to deliver or receive as the case may be. But in almost all
exchange dealings both parties do in fact intend, to the extent of their
initial contracts of purchase or sale, to enter into later contracts which,
by the process of transfer between brokers on the exchange, will render
unnecessary delivery under either set of contracts. The issue is very
simple: Is a future contract valid where made by the parties with the
understanding that, standing alone, it absolutely requires delivery, if the
parties do intend to dispose of their contract rights by assignment or to
make counter-transactions so that they personally will never be required
to deliver or receive?
Several significant factors are to be observed about the circumstances
which have now been indicated. In the first place, the mechanism of
the modern commodities exchange is now so constituted that contract
rights in grain have become, within the limits of the exchange, highly
negotiable. This negotiability is now accomplished, not by the assign-
ment of rights under existing contracts,36 but, through the mechanism
of the clearing-house, by making other contracts.37 The result is that
rights in grain pass freely from hand to hand by a system of cancellation,
and it is a simple matter to get "in" or "out" of the market at will.
36. The old methods of "ringing-out" and "setting-off" involved an element of assign-
ment. Cf. note 19, supra. Thus in a case where A has sold to B, and B to C, B cancels his
two trades by assigning his contract of sale to A, and his contract of purchase to C, mak-
ing allowance for any difference in price between the two trades.
37. The operation of the clearing-house likewise involves an element of assignment, but
the assignment does not directly accomplish the cancelling purpose. As pointed out pp.
68-70, supra, both ends of every contract, whether or not it is eventually closd out, are
assigned to the clearing-house. The cancelling process can be illustrated by a simple
diagram:
(a) A sells to B
at the end of the day, after assignment to the clearing-house (CH)
(b) A sells to CH (c) CH sells to B
subsequently
(d) A buys from C
(e) B sells to D
at the end of the day
(f) CH sells to A (g) CH buys from C
(h) B sells to CH (i) CH sells to D
subsequently
(j) C buys from D
at the end of the day
(k) C buys from CH (1) CH buys from D
It will be observed that (b) and (f) cancel, likewise (c) and (h), (g) and (k), and (i)
and (1). Thus all trades are cancelled out, although A never dealt directly with D, nor R
with C.
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The function of the broker is to put this exchange mechanism at the
disposal of his customer. But, in order to make possible this swift and
automatic assignment and cancellation process, it is essential that the
broker subject himself to the liabilities of a principal so far as relations
with other brokers are concerned. Thus no broker needs to look beyond
the credit of the broker he is dealing with,3" but each must himself
rely upon the credit of his own principal. Yet the prompt acquisition
and disposal of contract rights which the broker's unqualified liability
makes possible has in effect rendered obsolete the "intent test" as orig-
inally conceived, for that test was framed for application to contracts
which mature between the original parties thereto, unaffected by the
formation of later contracts.
Likewise it should be noted that, while there undoubtedly is a real
agreement between the initial parties to a contract that, by itself, it shall
require delivery to be made,39 yet the intent of either party to execute a
cancelling contract is independent of that of the other in this respect,
for a counter-transaction with a third person will serve the same purpose.
Thus the nice distinctions which have been drawn 40 between the "un-
disclosed intent of one," "disclosed intent of one," "mutual intent," and
"agreement or understanding" are obsolete and meaningless as applied to
exchange dealings.41  As long as the understanding is that the first con-
tract standing alone requires delivery, its enforceability by either party,
if any test is to be set up, should depend on that party's individual
intent, disclosed or undisclosed, for that alone is of significance.
Lastly, it is plain that the question of intent between broker and
38. Since the clearing-house system has come into use, a broker need pay little attention
to the credit of the broker with whom he deals, because the clearing-house assumes all
trades. Brokers are required to post margins with the clearing-house, and formerly put up
margins with each other directly.
39. The exchange rules under which brokers contract always require such an agreement.
Sometimes it has been suggested that, because of these rules, contracts between brokers are
valid, whereas those between broker and customer may not be. See 3 WILLISoN, CON-
TRACTS § 1671. But this argument seems to be based upon the mistaken notion that the
rule requires physical delivery to be made on all contracts entered into, whereas in truth
it only requires delivery on contracts which have not been cancelled before delivery comes
due. Furthermore, the "confirmation" sent to the customer after his order has been
executed always states that delivery is contemplated, in the same sense as has just been
indicated. The rules, therefore, bind neither customer nor broker to deliver if either executes
a counter-transaction, and the question of legality is the same in both cases.
40. See 3 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1673; Patterson, supra note 6, at 856-863.
41. These distinctions are, of course, of relevance in cases involving future contracts
entered into apart from exchanges. Such litigation still occurs, but very infreqtfently.
For examples, see McLure v. Wilson, 292 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); McVean v.
Wehmeier, 215 Mo. App. 587, 256 S. W. 1085 (1923); Yontz v. McVean, 202 Mo. App. 377,
217 S. W. 1000 (1920); Taylor v. Sebastian, 158 Mo. App. 147, 138 S. W. 549 (1911);
Waterman v. Buckland, 1 Mo. App. 45 (1876); Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202 (1877);
Eichleay v. Antonoplos, 164 AtI. 343 (Pa. 1932); Grizewood v. Blane, supra note 12.
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customer is the same as that between brokers. Just as do the exchange
brokers who contract as principals, so do the broker and his customer
contemplate that a single future contract can only be settled by de-
livery. And just as brokers trading on their own account generally in-
tend to set off counter-transactions against their original contracts, so
do the broker and his customer. It is, of course, theoretically con-
ceiveable that a broker might guarantee his customer against being
forced to deliver or receive under any circumstances, but why should
either party desire such an arrangement when, by making countertrans-
actions, escape from the necessity of delivery is certain? Both between
brokers and between broker and customer, the same central issue re-
curs: Is an agreement that delivery shall be required unless a counter-
transaction is made, coupled with an intent to make a counter-trans-
action, valid or invalid?42
Much of what has now been said was clearly understood by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Sawyer, Wallace & Co. v. Taggart,43 de-
42. To clarify the thought at this point, it will be well to discuss briefly another way
in which the same general thought has been expressed. It is clear that, under the ex-
change system of trading, the customer in effect has an option of requiring the delivery to be
made. Hence the question has sometimes been raised whether a single contract which
the parties understand to require delivery at the option of either is valid. But this is not
quite the actual situation in exchange dealing. The clearing-house always requires that
every contract which has not been closed out be conipleted by actual delivery. Nor, under
the system which preceded the clearing-house, would brokers usually have been willing to
settle an open contract on differences. Of course the same result is achieved by the execu-
tion of a counter-transaction, and by choosing to make or not to make a counter-transac-
tion a party in effect can exercise an option to require delivery under the first contract.
And, off the exchange, it is wholly conceivable that such an option contract might be made.
Accordingly, it is sometimes stated that a future contract is valid if either party thereto
can require that delivery be made. Sampson v. Camperdown Cotton Mills, 82 Fed. 833
(C. C. D. S. C. 1897); Hill v. Levy, 98 Fed. 94 (E. D. Va. 1899); Clarke v. Foss, supra
note 22; see United States v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, 263 U. S. 611, 619 (1924);
Harvey v. Merrill, supra note 31. A North Carolina statute establishes this as the test of
validity. N. C. CODE Awsr. (1931) § 2144. On the other hand, it has occasionally been
expressly held that a mere option of either party to require delivery will not validate the
contract if neither intends to require delivery. Riordan & Co. v. Doty, 50 S. C. 537, 27
S. E. 939 (1897) ; Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan, supra note 14. See First National
Bank of El Paso v. Miller, 235 Ill. 135, 85 N. E. 312 (1908). Ci. Bryant v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 17 Fed. 825 (C. C. D. Ky. 1883).
The conceptual validity of this test has been attacked on the ground that the assumption
that either party may at his option enforce delivery begs the very question at issue, since
neither party can enforce delivery unless the contract is valid. See Patterson, supra note
6, at 865. But this criticism is based upon a misapprehension of the test. When it is said
that either party may require or enforce delivery, it is not meant that either can go to law
and persuade a court to order delivery or award damages, but that according to the terms
of the contract and the understanding of the parties either may require delivery. As long as
"require" is used in the latter sense, there is no fallacy of assuming validity in stating
the test.
43. 14 Bush 727 (Ky. 1879).
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cided in 1879, and that court held that an intent to make a counter-
transaction does not invalidate the initial contract. But most courts
have failed to appreciate, or have concealed their understanding, that
the answer to this question is fundamental in determining the validity of
almost all future contracts. For some reason, contracts between brokers
have fared better than those between broker and customer. Although
the former are very infrequently litigated, the question of their validity
did arise in the leading case of Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co.,40 and it was there held by the Supreme Court of the United States
that contracts made in the pit by brokers were valid, despite an intent
to set off. The enforceability of the contract relations between broker
and customer were expressly left undecided.46 The Circuit Courts of
Appeals for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have applied the principles
of the Christie case to suits between brokers and customers, and have
ruled that the customer's intent to set off, communicated to the broker,
does not prevent enforcement.4 The Kentucky courts, after a
temporary apostasy,4 have recently returned to the doctrine announced
in the Taggart case.49  These cases 10 are, however, very distinctly the
44. Contracts between brokers or between the two real principals to an exchange con-
tract were enforced in Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461 (1901); Beall v. Board of Trade
of Kansas City, 164 Mo. App. 186, 148 S. W. 386 (1912); Story v. Salomon, 71 N. Y.
420 (1877). Enforcement was refused in In re Chandler, supra note 14 (defendant trying
to run a "corner"); J. B. Lyon & Co. v. Culbertson, 83 Ill. 33 (1876); Pickering v. Cease,
79 I1. 328 (1875) ; Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan, supra note 14.
45. 198 U. S. 236 (1905). The Chicago Board of Trade here sought to enjoin the de-
fendant from using its quotations after violations of its regulations against bucketing. The
defendant pleaded that the Board was itself a gambling institution and a bucket-shop.
This contention was disapproved, and the validity of "setting-off" and "ringing-out" was
affirmed. Cf. United States v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, supra note 42; Legis.
(1932) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 912, 914, n. 17.
46. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., supra note 45, at 250.
47. Ponder v. Jerome Hill Cotton Co., 100 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); Cleage v.
Laidley, 149 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Gettys v. Newburger, supra note 33, cert. den.,
257 U. S. 649 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 260 U. S. 693 (1922); Lamson Brothers &
Co. v. Turner, supra note 33; Solomon v. Newburger, 35 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929);
Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe & Carkener, Inc., 46 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
48. Beadles, Wood & Co. v. McElrath & Co., 85 Ky. 230, 3 S. W. 152 (1887).
49. W. R. Craig & Co. v. Johnson, 225 Ky. 440, 9 S. W. (2d) 110 (1928); cf. Bass v.
Simon, 241 Ky. 666, 44 S. W. (2d) 587 (1931); Johnson v. John F. Clark & Co., 224 Ky. 598,
6 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1927). The rule in New Jersey is now similar. Clucas v. Bank of
Montclair, 166 Atl. 311 (N. J. 1933); cf. Hoit v. Zyskind, 9 N. J. Misc. 561, 155 AtI. 136
(1931); Carpenter v. Kilborn, 162 AtI. 747 (N. J. 1932).
50. Sampson v. Camperdown Cotton Mills, supra note 42, and the cases there cited in
accord, really have much the same effect as do the federal and Kentucky cases just cited,
since the principle they approve would legitimatize exchange dealings. See also Fenner &
Beane v. Olive, 147 So. 147 (Ala. 1933); Morgan v. Rose, 62 S. W. (2d) 1022 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933); Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Currey, 175 Ala. 373, 57 So. 962 (1911);
Stewart Brothers v. Beeson, 148 So. 703 (La. 1933); Kahn v. Schlesner, 166 AtI. 435
(Md. 1933).
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exception rather than the rule. It is true that in only a few decisions
has the intent to set off been expressly held invalid."' But the great
majority of cases have construed mere statements by the customer that
he did not intend to deliver or receive and so informed his broker, par-
ticularly when coupled with evidence that previous transactions between
the same parties had been "settled without delivery," as sufficient to
support the defense of illegality." Yet these statements may indicate
merely an intent to set off, and, as has been shown, the intent to set off
is in fact almost invariably present. The courts have apparently not
realized that such intent is not incompatible with intent to make a con-
tract which requires delivery. And realization of the nature of the issue
is almost as important as the answer itself, for the uncertainty which
has resulted from failure to lay down an intelligible and predictable rule
is most unfortunate. 3 It is curious that the courts should have over-
51. Melchert v. American Union Telegraph Co., 11 Fed. 193 (C. C. D. Iowa 13S2);
Smith and Mann v. Bailey, 200 Mo. App. 627, 209 S. W. 945 (1919); Minzesheimer v. Doo-
little, 60 N. J. Eq. 394, 45 Ath 611 (1900). Cf. Riordon v. McCabe, supra note 33, in
which it is expressly stated that an intent to set off is legal, but where the contract was
nonetheless invalidated on the strength of evidence which proved nothing more than an
intent to set off.
52. Embrey v. Jemison, supra note 34; Andrews v. George M. Shutt & Co., 44 F. (2d)
337 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) ; Clark v. McNeill, 25 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) ; Chickasha
Cotton Oil Co. v. Chapman, 4 F. (2d) 319 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925); Alex Hyman & Co. v.
Hay, 277 Fed. 898 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); Williamson v. Majors, supra note 33; Carpenter
v. Beal-McDonnell & Co., 222 Fed. 453 (E. D. Ark. 1915); Waldron v. Johnston, 86 Fed.
757 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1898); Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Watson, 30 Fed.
653 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1887); Cobb v. Prell, 15 Fed. 774 (C. C. D. Kan. 1883); Melchert
v. American Union Telegraph Co., supra note 51; In re Green, supra note 14; Huff v.
State, 164 Ark. 211, 261 S. W. 654 (1924); Coughlin v. Ferro, 164 Wash. 90, 1 P. (2d)
910 (1931); Hutchinson v. Brown, supra note 15; White v. Turner-Hudnut Co., 322 IIl.
133, 152 N. E. 572 (1926); Weare Commission Co. v. People, 209 Ill. 528, 70 N. E. 1076
(1904); Cothran v. Ellis, 125 Ill. 496, 16 N. E. 646 (1888); J. B. Lyon & Co. v. Culbert-
son, Blair & Co., 83 Ill. 33 (1876); Beadles, Wood & Co. v. McElrath, supra note 48;
Gregory and McHardy v. Wendell and Clark, 39 Mich. 337 (1878); Alamaris v. Jno. F.
Clark & Co., supra note 15; Price v. Barnes' Estate, 300 Mo. 216, 254 S. W. 33 (1923);
Whorley v. Patton-Kjose Co., 90 Mont. 461, 5 P. (2d) 210 (1931); C. A. King & Co. v.
Horton, 116 Ohio St. 205, 156 N. E. 124 (1927); Erwin v. White, supra note 15; Ware
v. Burleson, 41 S. W. (2d) 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Allen v. Denman, 278 S. W. S99
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Barnard v. Backhaus, supra note 14; Topper Grain Co. v. Mantz,
[1926) 2 D. L. R. 712; cf. Riordon v. McCabe, s-pra note 33.
53. The result has been that particular cases are decided on the basis of unimportant
vagaries in the evidence. Of recent years most cases have turned upon the degree of
proof that the customer's "intent not to deliver" was known to the broker. As shown, p.
76, supra, this is a question wholly without substance in the great majority of cases, for
the broker and customer almost always contemplate the execution of counter-transactions.
In cases where the broker and customer have been dealing together for a long time the
customer is more likely to succeed in establishing his bad intent, for evidence that previous
dealings between the particular parties have been settled without delivery is usually admis-
sible, whereas evidence that exchange contracts in general are settled without delivery is gen-
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looked the well-considered precedent which the Taggart case afforded
from an early date. A flat answer to the question "Is an intent to set
off legal?" would have rendered unnecessary practically all of this litiga-
tion.
Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Company
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the legal aspects of specula-
tion on commodities exchanges, the Supreme Court's disposition of the
Uhlmann case may now be examined in some detail. The exchange
contracts entered into by the Uhlmann Company as a result of the
orders given by the Carrollton defendants were, with one immaterial
exception, 4 executed on exchanges situated outside of Missouri. This
was expressly recognized by Mr. Justice Brandeis, who then went on
to state:
"But there were two distinct agreements: that between customer and com-
pany, in which both parties acted as principals; and that between the company
and brokers on the exchange, in which both of the parties there likewise acted
as principals. It does not follow that because the contracts between the mem-
bers of the exchanges were valid, those entered into by the company at Car-
rollton with Dickson and its other customers were valid also. Compare Board
of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 249-250. See, also,
Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1, 22 N. E. 49; Riordon v. McCabe, 341 Ill.
506, 512-15, 173 N. E. 660." 5
With this there is no necessary disagreement. It is not quite clear
whether, in speaking of the contract between the customer and the Com-
pany, the Court means the contract of agency, empowering the Company
to enter into contracts of sale and purchase on behalf of the customer,
or whether it is saying that there was a separate contract of sale and
purchase between the customer and the Company, distinct from the
exchange contract negotiated by the latter. If the former sense was the
one employed, there is no gainsaying that there were "two distinct agree-
ments." On the other hand, it seems doubtful if this is what was meant,
for certainly the agency contract would be valid if the exchange con-
tract were, since it would then be simply a grant of authority to make
erally excluded. The unfortunate consequences of the prevailing uncertainty are well il-
lustrated by a case in which the court set Aside as inconsistent special verdicts of a jury that
no delivery was intended and that the intention was to comply with the rules of the
Board of Trade. Mounger v. Wells, 30 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929). This decision,
of course, begs the central question of whether intent to set off is "intent not to deliver"
within the common-law rule.
54. One of the defendants made one trade on the Kansas City Board of Trade, but on
this he made a profit, and so it was not involved in the litigation. Transcript of Record,
48, 163, 167. '
55. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 1, at 193-194.
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valid contracts on behalf of the customer. If the latter sense is correct,
there seems to be an immediate statement that the Uhlmann Company
made future contracts on its own account with the defendants, and like-
wise entered into the exchange contracts solely on its own account and
not on the customers' behalf. That this is probable seems clear from the
Court's failure even to suggest that there might have been contracts
between the customers and the brokers with whom the Uhlmann Com-
pany dealt on the exchange, and which the clearing-house would have
adopted. The import of the cases cited bears out this conclusion.G
Thus it would appear that Mr. Justice Brandeis has already stated his
answer to the question which he now proceeds to state as fundamental
to a determination of the case:
"Whether the customer, in his agreement with the company, ordered that con-
tracts be entered into in his behalf on the exchange, is the serious issue of fact
in the case at bar. If the customer did so order by his agreement, we should
have to determine by the law of which state the defense of illegality is gov-
erned. If, as Dickson contends, and the trial court found, Dickson's agreement
did not contemplate the execution of transactions on the exchange in his behalf,
clearly the defense of illegality is governed by the law of Missouri... . 57
This brings the problem very rapidly to a focus. It is clear that the
Court has perceived a possibility that the Carrollton defendants never
authorized the Uhlmann Company to execute any contracts on their
behalf on any exchanges, and that all they intended to do and reasonably
expressed as their intention was to make future contracts directly with
the Uhlmann Company itself as the other principal, which might or
might not be legal according to the intent of these particular parties.
This possibility involves the further hypothesis that the Uhlmann Com-
pany, for some reason of its own, executed exchange contracts on its own
account contemporaneous with and exactly corresponding to the custo-
mers' ends of the contracts between the customers and itself. There is
no denying that this is a theoretically possible situation. What does
Mr. Justice Brandeis adduce to give it reality?
"There was evidence that the transactions out of which the indebtedness
is alleged to have arisen were not in fact orders to enter into contracts on
behalf of the defendants to purchase or sell for future delivery, but were devices
knowingly employed by the company solely to enable them to gamble. They
testified that they were assured by the local manager that they would never
56. The citation to the Christie case refers, no doubt, to Mr. Justice Holmes' refusal to
pass on the validity of future contracts with respect to the rights and obligations of the
customers, while upholding the contracts between the brokers as principals. The Harvey
case found a distinct agreement between broker and customer that the latter should
not- be required to deliver or to receive.
57. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 1, at 194.
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have to receive or deliver any grain as a result of their speculations. And
there is no lack of evidence to support a finding that in doing so the manager
acted within the scope of his authority. It is admitted that no grain was
actually delivered by or to the plaintiff's customers." rs
In evaluating this evidence it must be recalled that it is not stated with
the object of proving the transactions illegal or unenforceable, but solely
as indicating that the exchange contracts entered into by the Uhlmann
Company were not authorized by the customers. In no way does it
support the latter conclusion. It has already been seen that future
contracts on exchanges can be cancelled by counter-transactions so that
no delivery occurs. The local manager could, with perfect truth, assure
the customers that, by cancelling their exchange contracts through
counter-transactions, they would never be required to receive or deliver.
For the same reason the fact that no grain was ever delivered is no
evidence of what Mr. Justice Brandeis is seeking to establish. All of
this evidence is perfectly compatible with the assumption that the custo-
mers authorized the Company to execute exchange contracts on their
account.
"The accounts of the defendants were carried on margin; and the extent of
their purported obligations exceeded their financial capacity. It is clear that.
their purpose was solely to make a profit by reason of the fluctuations in the
market price of grain; and that the plaintiff knew this." r9
These facts likewise are good evidence that the defendants intended
to execute counter-transactions, but wholly compatible with authority to
execute exchange contracts on their behalf.
"The Carrollton office was equipped in a manner common to bucket-shops;
its furnishings consisted of a desk, chairs, a typewriter, blackboard, and tele-
graph instrument." co
At this point the analysis is especially faulty. Probably all small
brokerage offices are equipped in a similar fashion. No suggestion ap-
pears why this description fits bucket-shops better than brokerage of-
fices. Certainly nothing that the Court anywhere states gives rise to
suspicion that the Uhlmann Company was bucketing in any legitimate
sense of the word."1
"The branch manager testified, as did the defendants, that he was active in
soliciting business among the townspeople. Between 40 and 50 local residents
53. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Id. at 194-195. This sentence is apparently taken from judge Kenyon's dissenting
opinion below. See Uhlmann Grain Co. v. Dickson, supra note 4, at 534.
61. See note 104, infra.
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from widely divergent walks of life in no way connected with purchasing or
selling grain became customers of the branch. Of the five defendants in the
cases consolidated for trial, who were the plaintiff's largest customers at Carroll-
ton, two were farmers, two were clothing merchants, and one was an ice
dealer. These defendants, who were not in the grain business, who had never
traded on a grain exchange, and who had no facilities for handling grain,
purported to buy and sell in amounts up to 50,000 bushels in a single trans-
action. In a period of nine months the total number of bushels involved in
the transactions of four of the defendants, according to one of the plaintiff's
witnesses, was 2,360,000." 62
Here, it would seem, is more argument by creation of atmosphere.'
Certainly the ethics of the Uhlmann Company in soliciting business in
such quantity from such customers are open to question. And, once
more, the occupations and financial status of the customers clearly
indicate that they were speculating and intended to close out their
orders by counter-transactions. But, no more than the other evidence,
does all this suggest that the customers did not authorize the execution
of exchange contracts.
It will now be interesting to see what explanation the Court offers
for the admitted fact that the Uhlmann Company did execute contracts
on the exchange, corresponding exactly to, whether or not authorized
by, the "orders" of the customers.
"The defendants undoubtedly knew that the company regularly entered into
contracts on the exchanges corresponding to the transactions at Carrollton.
But the evidence warrants the conclusion that the contracts on the exchange
were entered into by the company to enable it to secure the data for the
defendants' wagers and to provide the means for determining the defendants'
gains and losses; and that both the plaintiff and the defendants so regarded
the contracts on the exchanges. So far as concerned the obligations which they
undertook, the customers were in the same position as if they had simply
wagered against the company on the fluctuations in the prices of grain. Thus,
the evidence supports the conclusion that the transactions between the defen-
dants and the company were executed and performed wholly in Missouri; and
the law of Missouri accordingly governs. .. "64
The exchange contracts are thus explained as negotiated to secure
data for the wagers. This hypothesis must be analyzed in the light of a
few additional facts. The Uhlmann Company, before these transactions
occurred, was already a member of the Kansas City, Winnipeg and
Chicago produce exchanges, and of the Chicago clearing-house associa-
62. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 1, at 195.
63. It is very probable, however, that the sentences last quoted are indicative of the
underlying basis of the Court's decision. See pp. 102-104, infra.
64. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 1, at 195.
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tion05 It owned a large grain elevator, and did considerable business in
"cash grain." " Its customers on the future market, who lived in all
parts of the country, provided it with 400 to 500 active accounts.67 If
it had never established an office at Carrollton, it would have had the
right to receive and display quotations. For the privilege of relaying
quotations to Carrollton, the Uhlmann Company paid the Chicago
Board of Trade $7.50 per month.6" The quotations received on the
board there gave the price and amount of each transaction in wheat,
corn, oats and rye executed on the floors of the several exchanges. 69
These quotations were quite distinct from the particular trades put
through from Carrollton; they would have been relayed and posted if
no trades had ever been sent in from the Carrollton office. It is clear
that the defendants and the branch manager at Carrollton would have
had ample data on which t6 base their "wagers" irrespective of the execu-
tion by the Uhlmann Company of exchange contracts corresponding to
the "wagers" or "orders," as the case might be, of the defendants.
Transactions of other parties on the exchange provided a continuous
supply of quotations. The old type of bucket-shop in fact used such
quotations, and never executed its customers' orders.7" If the plaintiff
had really been bucketing, it would not have found it necessary to
execute exchange contracts, or to incur the expense of maintaining a
private wire over which orders could be transmitted to the exchange.
The explanation offered in the opinion can hardly be accorded serious
consideration. And for other reasons it is difficult if not impossible to
conclude that the exchange contracts were not authorized by the custo-
mers. If it be assumed that the plaintiff did contract as a principal with
the defendants, and that the exchange contracts were entered into
solely on the plaintiff's account, it is clear that the exchange contracts
served the plaintiff as a perfect "hedge" against its wagers with the
customers. Whatever the Company might lose on a wager with a custo-
mer, it would win on the corresponding exchange contract, and vice-
versa. Thus while it would be true, as the Court stated, that "the
customers were in the same position as if they had simply wagered
against the company," clearly the Uhlmann Company would be in
exactly the same position it would have been in had it executed orders
on the exchange under authority of the customers. In neither case would
it make any difference to the Company which way the market went. In
both cases the Company would be in the same contractual position
65. Transcript of Record, 30, 52.
66. Id. at 30, 57, 10.
67. Id. at 87.
68. Id. at 80.
69. Id. at 128, 135.
70. See note 104, infra.
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relative to the clearing-house; in both the Company would have to put up
a margin with the clearing-house and would have the. same reasons for
requiring margins from the defendants. What would it profit the Com-
pany to adopt the form for its transactions which the Supreme Court
found that it did adopt? What would it profit the customers to require
such a form, except that it would give them the opportunity to plead
illegality as a defense in the event of litigation? If the Company, then,
had nothing to gain from breaking exchange rules, exposing itself to a
conviction for bucket-shopping under any interpretation of the usual
statutes, and rendering it impossible to enforce the contracts with 'their
customers in any court, what conceivable possibility is there that it
should have done all this?
If the analysis of probabilities is abandoned and the record itself is
examined, the answer is the same. The plaintiff was a large brokerage
establishment with a wide range of business. It was not a fly-by-night
outfit making a one-night stand in Carrollton. It is inconceivable that
this sort of house could have entered into the sort of contracts the Court
found, when it stood to profit nothing thereby and knew full well the
risks to which such agreements would expose it. The testimony of the
only defendant who testified in any detail on the issue of his intent and
the nature of his agreement with the Uhlmann Company, and that of
the only important witness for the defense who was not a party, includes
nothing which suggests anything out of the ordinary course of specula-
tion.71 The defendants of course stated that they did not intend to
deliver or receive actual grain,7 2 and of course they did not so intend.
They testified that McDonough told them that they would not have to
deliver or receive grain,78 but cross-examination developed that all they
meant was that he had shown them that by "closing out" before delivery
was due they could avoid delivery.74 One defendant testified that he
knew McDonough would execute his orders on the exchange, and so
understood the contract." He admitted knowledge of the device of
"closing-out," and stated that he intended to and did use it. 6 Certainly
none of this testimony supports, or is easily compatible with, the theory
that the exchange contracts were not authorized by the customers.
The Court having in this manner arrived at the conclusion that
Missouri law alone was applicable, the decision, so far as state law was
71. Part of the testimony for the defendants is reproduced in Judge Gardner's opinion
in the Circuit Court of Appeals. See Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 4, at
529-30.
72. Transcript of Record, 144, 148.
73. Id. at 147, 150.
74. Transcript of Record, 146, 152.
75. Id. at 151.
76. Id. at 152, 154, 156, 157 (testimony of defendant Amos Dickson). It was stipulated
that all the defendants would give the same testimony. Id. at 158.
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concerned, followed as a matter of course. The exchange contracts
being held unauthorized, the validity of the agreements between the
plaintiff and the defendants alone remained in question. If these con-
tracts in fact existed, it was clear that they did not require either party
to receive or deliver grain, and that neither party so intended. Under
the Missouri statute, the bad intent of either party alone would have
sufficed to invalidate the contracts; in fact, whatever intent existed was
mutual. On the basis taken a judgment for the defendants was inevitable.
While it is easy to assert and support some dissatisfaction with the
factual analysis which enabled the Court to decide a supposititious
case,77 the proper determination of the case on its true facts and in terms
of settled doctrine is not free from difficulty. Some preliminary treat-
ment of the statutes and decisions in Missouri will be necessary. As
has already been shown, the Missouri courts originally subscribed to
the rule that future contracts on exchanges would be enforced unless
it could be shown that the intent of the principals on both sides of the
contracts was that no delivery would be made.7" As a result of the
practical impossibility of proving the intent of both principals, specula-
tive contracts were almost uniformly upheld.79 Probably as a result of
this attitude of the courts, the legislature of Missouri in 1889 adopted
a new anti-gambling statute (the usual form of bucket-shop statute hav-
ing been passed in 1887),10 under which the intent of either party to a
future contract not to make or take delivery was sufficient to render it
illegal.81  By this statute the innocent suffer with the guilty. But even
77. See (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Rav. 881, 882. Cf. State v. Christopher, 318 Mo. 225,
2 S. W. (2d) 621 (1927), where the facts seem to have been subjected to a strikingly
similar misinterpretation.
78. See p. 71 and note 28, supra.
79. See cases cited note 28, supra. In two cases, however, the broker was denied re-
covery on the ground that the client had authorized him only to make an invalid contract.
Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498, 4 S. W. 713 (1887); Hill v. Johnson, 38 Mo. App. 383
(1889).
80. The statute of 1887 now appears as Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § § 4316-4323.
81. Mo. RFv. STAT. (1929) § § 4324-29. The important section is 4324, which provides
that "All purchases and sales . . . of the shares of stock or bonds of any corporation, or...
grain or agricultural products whatever, either on nlargin or otherwise, without any inten-
tion of receiving and paying for the property so bought, or of delivering the property so
sold, and all buying or selling . . . of such property ... when the party selling the same ...
does not intend to have the full amount of the property on hand or under his control to
deliver upon such a sale, or when the party buying any of such property . . . does not
intend actually to receive the full amount of the same if purchased, are hereby declared
to be gambling and unlawful. . . " Section 4326 punishes the maintenance of a place
where contracts violating Section 4324 are made.
The Missouri courts hold that under Section 4324 the evil intention of either party to a
future contract, even if not communicated to the other party, invalidates the contract.
Connor v. Black, 119 Mo. 126, 24 S. W. 184 (1893); Connor v. Black, 132 Mo. 150, 33
S. W. 783 (1896); State v. Cunningham, 154 Mo. 161, 55 S. W. 282 (1900); Price v.
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this herculean measure did not invalidate all speculation. While Mis-
souri contains one large commodities exchange, the Kansas City Board
of Trade, a large proportion of Missouri speculation takes place on the
Chicago Board of Trade, and most of the stock speculation on the New
York Stock Exchange. Where foreign exchanges are used, negotiations
between broker and customer in Missouri result in a contract executed
outside the state. The Missouri courts held that the statute of 1889 had
no extra-territorial application, and that the validity of such transactions
was governed by the law of the state where the exchange was located.2
For some reason, no Missouri litigants appear to have offered evidence of
the law of a foreign jurisdiction in speculation cases, and so the Missouri
courts have continued to indulge the presumption that the foreign law
is the same as the common law of Missouri, under which the intent of
both parties had to be shown.83 The original rule that the intent of
both principals to exchange contracts must be shown does not seem to
have persisted, 4 but the Missouri courts have been slow to find that the
broker knew of the customer's evil intent where the contracts were
executed on a foreign exchange.a
The conclusion reached by the Missouri courts, that the validity of
future contracts on exchanges is governed by the law of the place where
the exchange is located, is in accord with the general rule. 6 The trans-
Barnes' Estate, supra note 52; McVean v. Wehmeier, supra note 41; Smith and Mann v.
Bailey, supra note 51. The same result has been reached under a statute of Tennessee. Mc-
Grew v. City Produce Exchange, 85 Tenn. 572, 4 S. W. 38 (1887); see Guarantee Co. of
North America v. Mechanics' Savings Bank and Trust Co., 183 U. S. 402, 417 (1902);
Berry v. Chase, 146 Fed. 625, 628 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906); Williamson v. Majors, supra note
33, at 763. See also Patterson, supra note 6, at 857, n. 42; cf. McLure v. Wilson, supra
note 41.
82. Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson, 160 Mo. 516, 61 S. W. 617 (1901); State v.
Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512, 36 S. W. 39 (1896); Gordon v. Andrews, supra note 28; Claiborne
Commission Co. v. Stirlen, 262 S. W. 387 (Mo. App. 1924); J. E. Hood & Co. v. McCune,
supra note 33; Atwater v. A. G. Edwards Brokerage Co., 147 Mo. App. 436, 126 S. W. 823
(1910); Gaylord v. Duryea, 95 Mo. App. 574, 69 S. W. 607 (1902).
83. See cases cited note 82, supra.
84. But cf. Gordon v. Andrews, supra notes 28 and 82.
85. See cases cited note 82, supra. The broker has not fared so well, however, in cases
where he has sought to recover upoif an account stated covering trades executed on ex-
changes both within and without Missouri. If the customer proves his own illegal intent,
it is held that the illegality of the local transactions taints the whole account, and no
recovery is allowed on the foreign trades. Price v. Barnes' Estate, supra note 52; Elmore-
Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker, 202 Mo. App. 81, 214 S. W. 216 (1919). It has been
held that "puts" and "calls" are within the statute of 1889. Lane v. Logan Grain Co.,
105 Mo. App. 215, 79 S. W. 722 (1904); see Elmore-Schultz Co. v. Stonebraker, supra, at
93-98, 214 S. W. at 220-221. Contra: Taylor v. Sebastian, supra note 41. See note 127,
infra.
86. Mullinix v. Hubbard, 6 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Ward v. Vosburgh, supra
note 26; Lehman v. Feld; Lamson Brothers & Co. v. Turner, both supra note 33; Wilhite
v. Houston, supra note 23; Jacobs v. Hyman, 286 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Berry v.
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actions here involved were executed in Illinois, Minnesota and Manitoba.
Since nothing appears to show that the exchange contracts executed in
these states were not authorized by the defendants, the Missouri statutes,
as construed by the couits of that state, had no application . 7 Although
the Missouri courts, like most state courts, assume the law of the
foreign jurisdiction to be the same as their own common law,"' the
federal courts take judicial notice of the statutes and rules of decision
in the various states.8 9 There was therefore no necessity here to plead
and prove the law of Illinois or of Minnesota. In the latter state, while it
has not been specifically held that an intent to avoid delivery by execut-
ing counter-transactions is illegal, undoubtedly the courts would hold
ordinary speculation illegal where, as here, it is clear from the occupa-
tions and financial status of the customers that they could have had no
use for actual grain, and that the broker knew they had no intent to take
delivery.?0 Although the latest decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois
is not free from ambiguity in this particular, probably the result would
be the same in that state.9' Since the federal courts do not take judicial
notice of the law of foreign countries, 2 in the absence of any evidence
of the law of Manitoba it should be presumed to be like the common law
of Missouri. 3 Probably under the law of Missouri these contracts would
not have been enforced, although the cases are erratic. 4
Chase, supra note 81; Williams, Black & Co. v. Carr, supra note 28; see Harvey v. Merrill,
supra note 31, at 5. But cf. Williamson v. Majors, supra note 33. If the foreign law is
strongly contrary to the public policy of the forum, it will not be applied. Flagg v.
Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219 (1884); Pope v. Hanke, supra note 34; see Parker v. Moore,
115 Fed. 799, 802 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902). But in Missouri public policy does not prevent the
enforcement of future contracts which are valid where made. Maxey v. Railey & Brothers
Banking Co., 57 S. W. (2d) 1091 (Mo. App. 1933).
87. See cases cited note 82, supra.
88. Ibid.
89 Lamar v. Micou, 114 U. S. 218 (1885).
90. Fraser v. Farmers' Co-operative Co., 167 Minn. 369, 209 N. W. 33 (1926); Bolfing
v. Schoener, 144 Minn. 425, 175 N. W. 901 (1920); Mohr v. Miesen, 47 Minn. 228, 49 N.
W. 862 (1891).
91. White v. Turner-Hudnut Co.; Weare Commission Co. v. People, both supra note 52;
Pardridge v. Cutler; Jamieson v. Wallace, both supra note 33. The same result was reached
in Riordon v. McCabe, supra note 33, but nevertheless the court stated that a mere intent
to set off does not invalidate the contract. See id. at 512-517, 173 N. E. at 663-64.
92. Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenb Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 397
(1889); Dianese v. Hale, 91 U. S. 13 (1875).
93. Secoulsky v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 223 Mass. 465, 112 N. E. 151 (1916);
Linton v. Moorhead, 209 Pa. 646, 59 Atl. 264 (1904); see Panama Electric Ry. Co. v.
Moyers, 249 Fed. 19, 21 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918); 5 WiGoREO, EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 1923) § 2536.
See also the Missouri cases cited note 82, supra.
94. State v. Christopher, supra note 77; Price v. Barnes' Estate, supra note 52; Smith
and Mann v. Bailey, supra note 51. C., however, Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson;
Claiborne Commission Co. v. Stirlen, both supra note 82. For the Manitoba law see Wood-
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In all of these states the field of speculation is covered by bucket-shop
and gambling statutes 5  While, with the exception of Missouri, these
statutes simply state the common law "intent test," decisions of the
courts of these states are undoubtedly to be treated as constructions of
the statutes, and therefore binding on the federal courts. It must be
said, however, that in this field that rule has been but little observed.
The decisions in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits upholding an intent to
execute counter-transactions were rendered in cases which arose in states
that have enunciated no such doctrine, and whose courts have refused
to enforce speculative contracts on indistinguishable facts.9 Mr. Justice
Holmes, in the Christie case, paid scant attention to the law of Illinois."
And it is easy to honor state decisions at once in breach and observance
by acknowledging the "intent test" as they state it, and then referring to
Mr. Justice Holmes' oft-quoted remark that "a set-off is in legal effect a
delivery." 11 In this particular situation, where the state decisions so
often seem to be based upon an incomplete understanding of the facts,
and where a more intelligent disposition involves no patent flouting of
rules as expressed by the state courts, it is arguable that some sleight-
of-hand is justifiable. On the other hand, it is plain that, if the Court
in the Uhlmann case was determined to be very scrupulous about giving
full effect to state decisions under gambling and bucket-shop statutes,
and apart from any question of federal legislation, a disposition of the
case favorable to the defendants is wholly defensible.
ward & Co. v. Koefoed, 62 D. L. R. 431 (1921); cf. Maloof v. Bickell & Co., 50 D. L. R.
590 (1919).
95. ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 38, § § 308-09, 317-18; Mn=. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ § 10488-89, 10223-1, 10223-2, 10223-3; Mo. Ray. STAT. (1929) § § 4316-4329; see Legis.
(1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 912, 916-22.
96. For instance, in Cleage v. Laidley, supra note 47, the court looked to the pronounce-
ment of the Supreme Court in the Christie case rather than to applicable decisions in Illinois
and Missouri. Lamson Brothers & Co. v. Turner, supra, note 33, paid no attention to the
Illinois decisions. Solomon v. Newburger, supra note 47, relied solely upon "decisions of
this circuit, of the Supreme Court, and of the federal courts generally." The same was
true in Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe & Carkener, Inc., supra note 47, in which case apart
from the Grain Futures Act, Illinois and Missouri decisions should have governed.
97. Cf. with the Christie case those cited note 91, supra, and Central Stock and Grain
Exchange v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 196 Ill. 396, 63 N. E. 740 (1902).
The Illinois cases on speculative contracts have from the outset been very confused. Thus
an Illinois statute which gave the "loser" of a bet a cause of action to recover his losses
from the "winner" was construed to allow a customer to recover speculative losses from
his broker, despite clear evidence that the broker "won" nothing. Pearce v. Foote; Kruse
v. Kennett, both supra note 16; see Pelouze v. Slaughter, 241 Ill. 215, 227, 89 N. E. 259,
263 (1909). An amendment to the statute in 1913 intended to abolish this egregious
misconstruction of the statute by exempting commission brokers from its operation was
held unconstitutional as discriminatory. Miller v. Sincere, 273 Ill. 194, 112 N. E. 664
(1916).
98. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., supra note 45, at 250.
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Prohibition or Recognition?
Now that the fundamental issue has been made clear, what should be
its answer? That answer should be framed with the realization that the
legal validity of speculation as it is now carried on is at stake. If an
intent to set off is held to render future contracts unenforceable and
illegal, the result will be that substantially all the future contracts en-
tered into on all the commodities exchanges of the nation are thereby
invalidated. The question of law and policy is plain: Should the
courts outlaw speculation on commodities exchanges?
The relation of the question to the orthodox test of what constitutes
a wagering contract is not difficult of analysisY9 Clearly speculation in
commodity futures does not usually involve the purchase and sale of
physical property. Just as clearly it does not consist in mere betting on
fluctuations in the price of the subject-matter. The former is manifest
from the insignificant percentage of contracts consummated by de-
livery;'100 the latter perhaps needs explanation. Speculation is not
betting because delivery of actual goods can be required '01 on future
contracts. It is for this reason that the future contracts are themselves
an expression of, and to some extent a factor influencing, prices. The
fact that the subject-matter can be required actually to pass under the
contract is the very reason why the prices at which these contracts
are made always conform closely to the best guesses of trained observers
as to what the subject-matter will in fact sell for when delivery is due.
So the difference between intent to set off on the one hand and intent
to make a fictitious contract on the other is a real one, and the fact
that a future contract standing by itself requires delivery, is of im-
portance, even though any particular parties to a future contract intend
to avoid delivery by setting off. Commodities exchange speculation,
therefore, consists in the purchase and sale of contract rights in un-
identified grain. A speculator makes no promise of a performance for
which there is no agreed exchange; if he undertakes to deliver, he
receives a promise to pay for what is delivered, and by delivering he can
require full payment. If he promises to pay for a given amount of goods,
he receives a promise to deliver that identical amount, and, by paying in
full, he can enforce such delivery. He clearly has an "interest" outside
of the contingency which determines whether he gains or loses, for he
always has a contract right to trade money for goods, or goods for money.
He may have no use for the goods intrinsically, but no more use has a
speculator in Florida real estate for the land; both are curious only
99. See notes 8 and 11, supra.
100. See note 19, supra.
101. Again it is necessary to point out that "require" is used in the sense that the
parties understand and agree that delivery may be required, not in the sense that the law
will necessarily enforce the contract. See note 42, supra.
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about the course of prices. Both make a deal which expresses and to
some extent influences the prices which interest them. Now, however
pernicious unbridled speculation by actual purchase and sale of real
estate may be, no court has ever seen fit to impugn its contractual
validity. Is there any basis for distinguishing speculation by purchase
and sale of contract rights to goods?
Plainly, there are differences both of form and of substance. These
differences arise out of the process of assignment 'and cancellation de-
veloped on commodities exchanges whereby actual physical transfer of
the property traded in is substantially eliminated. No passage of title
to goods is necessarily involved in future contract speculation, and
contract rights pass by assignment rather than sale, whereas in real
estate speculation, and in other forms not conducted on exchanges, there
is actual physical transfer and title passes by a real sale. In other
words, the exchange speculator's contract interest need not and gen-
erally does not ripen into a property interest. The great difference of
substance is that speculation in futures requires much less capital than
does speculation in property rights. The former requires only enough
capital to cover the risk of fluctuation in price. Since no goods what-
soever are specified, there is no risk of damage to or destruction of the
commodities-the only risk is that of price. The latter, of course,
requires capital sufficient to negotiate transfers of title to specific
property. It involves the risk of injury to or loss of the property while
it is being "held for the rise." An ancillary difference is that, since con-
tract rights in unspecified goods are fungible, trading is much more
liquid than is trading in specified goods or realty. One need not be a
judge of the quality of particular goods, for bargains are not struck with
respect to particular goods. This simplicity of the mechanics and
technique of exchange speculation, coupled with the small amount of
capital needed, is, of course, responsible for the participation in exchange
speculation of great numbers of "non-professionals."
Clearly, the issue is one which argument by legal precedent and
analogy scarcely helps to solve. Speculation in futures may readily be
likened to speculation by actual purchase and sale, and thus escape
condemnation under the "wager" test. With equal ease, insistence can
be made upon real differences between the two forms. The fundamental
issue is one of policy and expediency, and it should be frankly en-
countered on that basis.
This is not the place to consider at length the economic and
sociological arguments for and against speculation."0 2 In its behalf,
economists have consistently urged its tendency to bring the immediate
102. See treatises cited note 17, supra, and HuEBNER, TiE STOCK MARXEr (1922); ELY,
OuTrwmS or Ecoxomncs (5th ed. 1930) 633-35; 1 TAusSiG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (3d
ed. 1921) 156-66.
[Vol. 43
TRADING IN COMMODITY FUTURES
rate of consumption into harmony with the prospect of future supply,
and its consequent stabilizing effect upon prices. They have pointed
out also the facilities which it affords to dealers and manufacturers for*
"hedging" 103 themselves against fluctuations in the value of their raw
materials and finished wares, with consequent reduction in the cost of
goods to the consumer. Against speculation is urged with equal
vehemence and show of reason "the waste of much brains and energy
on unproductive doings," and the demoralization of the community from
excessive indulgence of the gambling spirit. No authoritative verdict
has yet been rendered, and no attempt to balance the elements of good
and evil will here be made. All that is now insisted upon is that com-
modities exchanges as they are now constituted are performing necessary
economic functions. It may be that some other mechanism can be de-
veloped which will make possible price quotations based upon all avail-
able sources of information, and tend to keep present consumption in
reasonable relation to future supply. It may be that grain-elevators,
warehouses and mills will find a new device for protecting themselves
103. "Hedging" is a device used by millers, warehousemen and others the nature of
whose business obliges them to buy and hold large quantities of actual commodities to
protect themselves against fluctuation in the price of the commodities. For example, a
miller who has bought 10,000 bushels of actual grain will sell an equal amount for future
delivery. Any decline in the value of the actual grain he holds will be counter-balanced by
a profit on his "short sale." Similarly, he will lose the chance of a speculative profit. For
technical discussions of this subject, see HoFrm., HEDaIN By DEAiNG IN GAIN FTJuREs
(1925); (1931) 155 ANN. Am. AcAD. 7, 27, 79. The hedger normally intends to close out
his future contract by a counter-transaction, and therefore the question of the legality of
his operations is, on conceptual grounds, the same as that of the legality of ordinary
speculation. Nevertheless, some courts which condemn ordinary speculation have en-
forced or approved contracts entered into as "hedges." McCarthy Brothers Co. v.
Equity Co-operative Association of Enid, 286 Fed. 171 (D. Mont. 1923); Edgeley Co-
operative Grain Co. v. Spitzer, 48 N. D. 406, 184 N. W. 880 (1921); John Miller Co. v.
Klovstad, 14 N. D. 435, 105 N. W. 164 (1905); see Bailey & Graham v. Phillips, 159 Fed.
535, 538 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1907); Fraser v. Farmers' Co-operative Co., supra note 90,
at 377, 209 N. W. at 37; Whorley v. Patton-Kjose Co., supra note 52, at 214; cf.
Bolfing v. Schoener, supra note 90; Edward R. Bacon Grain Co. v. Reinecke, 26 F. (2d)
705 (N. D. flI. 1928). Where, as in the federal Eighth Circuit, an intent to set off does
not invalidate a contract, hedging is legitimate. See Lamson Brothers & Co. v. Turner,
supra note 33, at 684; Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe & Carkener, supra note 47, at 248;
Sampson v. Camperdown Cotton Mills, supra note 42 at 836; cf. Medlin Milling Co. v.
Moffatt Commission Co., 218 Fed. 686, 690 (W. D. Mo. 1915). The Supreme Court has
approved the practice of "hedging" by way of dictum. See Board of Trade v. Christie
Grain & Stock Co., supra note 45, at 249; Browne v. Thorne, supra note 22 at 140 ("hedg-
ing" prima facie lawful). But other courts have refused to recognize the legitimacy of
"hedging," either because they felt the common-law rule allowed of no such exception, or
because they thought that a statute dictated their conclusion. Falk v. J. N. Alexander
Mercantile Co., 138 Miss. 21, 102 So. 843 (1925); State v. McGinnis, 138 N. C. 724, 51
S. E. 50 (1905); Erwin v. White, supra note 15; cf. State v. Clayton, 138 N. C. 732, 50 S.




against speculative risks which they do not wish to encounter. Possibly
many of the vices inherent in the present exchange system will be
eliminated by some such revolution of method. Still it remains apparent
that these things are not yet, and that the commodities exchange remains
closely related and necessary to the nation's commodity marketing
system. The courts are confronted with a fait accompli. Shall they
recognize it?
Every dictate of common sense and past experience indicates that
they should. This is so, not because of any duty of the courts to bend
before the prevailing current of business practice, but because of the
limited sanction at their disposal. All that the courts can do is to decline
to enforce such speculative contracts as are litigated, and occasionally
to subject an ordinary broker to criminal penalties by misapplying a
bucket-shop statute. °4 It needs no perspicacity to perceive the utter
futility of these gestures. The courts have united in unqualified con-
demnation of speculation for eighty years, but can it be seriously
contended that its course has been thereby substantially checked? The
erratic and hostile attitude of the courts toward the exchanges has
104. Bucket-shopping is absolutely distinct from ordinary speculation, and comprises
several species of malpractice by brokers. Originally it consisted in a failure to execute
customers' transactions on the the exchange at all. The "commission" paid by the customer
in reality constituted "odds" in favor of the bucket-shop proprietor. Cf. Bryant v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., supra note 42. The more modem procedure involves
execution on the exchange of a customer's order, immediately followed by the execution of
a countertransaction on the account of the house itself. In either case it will be ob-
served that the bucket-shop takes a market position contrary to that of the customer, and,
in substance, bets against him on its own account. See BAER AND WOODRUFF, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 460, 467; HILL, GOLD Bcrons or SPECULATIoN (1904) ; MEExER, THn WORK OF
= STOCx ExcH oE (2d ed. 1930) 460, 587; Legis. (1932) 45 HAav. L. REv. 912, 915, n.
19, 916, n. 25.
In spite of these very distinct characteristics of bucketing, the statutes prohibiting the
practice have been drawn in general terms, and have condemned "keeping a place for the
pretended buying and selling of grain," or "a place where contracts for the purchase and
sale of commodities are entered into with no intention of fulfillment by delivery" See
Legis. (1932) 45 HAgv. L. REv. 912, 916 et seq. The courts have construed these statutes
as enacting the common-law test of the validity of future contracts, and consequently, in
most states, the proprietor of an office where ordinary speculation is carried on is liable to
conviction for a criminal offence under the bucket-shop statute. See, e.g., Fenner v. Boykin,
3 F. (2d) 674 (N. D. Ga. 1925); Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 92 S. E. 637 (1917); Weare
Commission Co. v. People, supra note 52; Soby v. People, 134 Ill. 66, 25 N. E. 109 (1890);
State v. Christopher, supra note 77; State v. McGinnis, supra note 103. The New York
statute regulating stock exchanges is carefully drawn, and expressly punishes trading against
a customer's orders, which is the essence of modern bucketing. N. Y. PNrAL LAW (1909) §
954, as added by LAws 1913, c. 592; see People v. Ruskay, 243 N. Y. 58, 152 N. E. 464
(1926); People v. MacMasters, 246 N. Y. 592, 159 N. E. 664 (1927). Probably at common
law and apart from any question of wagering a customer would not be held liable on
orders which his broker bucketed. Stiebel v. Lissberger, 166 App. Div. 164, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 822 (1st Dep't 1915), aff'd, 222 N. Y. 604, 118 N. E. 1078 (1918).
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simply tended to lower the moral sense of the community by encouraging
"welching." It is all very well for the courts to refuse to enforce frank
"bets," but to decline legal sanction to an enormous section of business
practice, much of which is carried on with serious and justifiable motives,
is to undermine respect for business obligations and endanger com-
mercial honesty.
The constant disapproval of the courts has in no way tended to
develop other and less objectionable institutions for performing the
functions now filled by the exchanges. There is little reason to believe
that the state statutes on gaming and bucket-shopping have had, or that
any similar laws can have, any more effect."0 5 Probably the situation
cannot be dealt with by mere prohibitory fiat, from whatever source it
emanates. The results of the German attempt to outlaw dealings in
grain futures suggest that prohibition, unconnected with constructive
suggestions and provisions for the encouragement of alternative institu-
tions, simply tends to drive speculators and dealers back to cruder, less
efficient underground operations and to further endanger business
morality.' And the recent trend of legislation in this country has been
toward recognizing de jure the already de facto legitimacy of exchange
operations, and bringing them under public supervision and control
with a view to mitigating, if possible, their less desirable features.°7
In such steps the courts can assist through intelligent interpretation and
application of regulatory laws.' But to persist in the pretence of
105. Most state statutes, whether enacted for the purpose of invalidating gambling
contracts or to punish bucket-shopping, have merely reiterated the common-law test. The
statutes are collected and analyzed in Legis. (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 912.
106. See Emery, Ten Years Regulation of the Stock Exchange in Germany (1908) 17
YALE REV. 5.
107. Statutes which expressly declare the legitimacy of "hedging" are examples of this
more recent approach. Mwn. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10223-3; S. C. Acts 1928, no. 652.
A curious Arizona statute validates "hedging" only when it is iarried on between a party
within and a party without the state. Aniz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4680. The same
was true under the TEXAFS PENAL CODE OF 1911, § 543, since repealed. Lowrie v. J. N.
Wisner & Co., 47 S. W. (2d) 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Mackay Telegraph-Cable Co. v.
Bain, 163 S. W. 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). And statutes recently passed in Arkansas,
Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Texas, which appear
to have been intended to legitimatize trading on established exchanges in accordance with
their rules, exhibit the same tendency. See Legis. (1932) 45 HARv. L. Ray. 912, 920. In
New York state several salutary provisions regulating the activities of stock brokers have
been enacted. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § § 951-956, as added to by Laws 1913, cc. 253,
475, 476, 500, 592. Federal legislation along regulatory lines is found in the Cotton
Futures Act, and the Grain Futures Act, both supra note 15. See pp. 94-102.
108. The courts have been most unwilling to construe statutes so as to effect any sub-
stantial departure from the "intent test." Thus in North Carolina a statute declaratory of
this test which excepted from its operation dealing by manufacturers and wholesalers in
the regular course of business was held not to validate "hedging." State v. McGinnis,
supra note 103. The only effect allowed the statute was to put the burden of proof on
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actually discouraging speculation by declining to enforce speculative con-
tracts is to.perpetuate a confused and futile policy.
The Grain Futures Act
In all that has been said heretofore it has been assumed that the
validity of future contracts in grain is in no way affected by and in
no way involves consideration of federal legislation. In 1922, however,
Congress enacted the Grain Futures Act,1° 9 which establishes certain
requisites for the validity of future contracts in grain, and subjects grain
exchanges to some measure of federal supervision and control." 0 The
the party alleging invalidity of the contract, if the party seeking enforcement came within
the "exception." Rodgers, McCabe & Co. v. Bell, 156 N. C. 378, 72 S. E. 817 (1911);
Alex. Sprunt & Sons v. May, 156 N. C. 388, 72 S. E. 821 (1911); Eure v. Sabiston, 195
Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912). The statutes passed in Mississippi and other Southern
states to legitimatize speculation pursuant to rules on exchanges contained ambiguous
phrases which the courts of Mississippi have seized on as an excuse for holding that the
"intent test" was in no way modified. Alamaris v. Jno. F. Clark & Co., supra note 15;
cf. Hutchinson v. Brown, supra note 15. The situation in Texas may now be worse than
it was before the "liberal" statute was enacted, for the former statute sanctioned inter-
state "hedging." See note 107, supra. Under the new statute all "hedging" may be illegal.
Erwin v. White, supra note 15. Contra: Morgan v. Rose, supra note 15. Compare with
the foregoing decisions the intelligent treatment accorded Section 954 of the NEw YoRK
P~nAL LAW, punishing trading against a customer's orders, by the New York courts. On
stock exchanges, the stock traded in actually passes from hand to hand on the day
following the particular trade, i.e. delivery is actually made, and the trade is closed.
Hence a house which desires to bucket its orders must execute counter-transactions on its
own account the same day that the customer's order is executed. Cf. note 104, supra. A
counter-order after actual delivery of stock on the customer's order does not nullify or
cancel the customer's trade, and therefore it was properly held that transactions by a
broker the day after the customer's order was executed, or later, did not violate the
statute. People v. Ruskay; People v. MacMasters, both supra note 104.
109. 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § § 1-17 (1926). The Grain Futures Act super-
seded the Future Trading Act, 42 STAT. 187 (1921), which imposed a prohibitive tax of
twenty cents per bushel on future contracts that did not meet its requirements, and which
was held unconstitutional as an improper exercise of the taxing power. Hill v. Wallace,
259 U. S. 44 (1922); Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475 (1926). The Grain Futures Act
was framed as a regulation of interstate commerce, imposing criminal penalties for its
violation. It was held constitutional in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1
(1923).
110. Cotton exchanges are also under some measure of federal control by virtue of
the Cotton Futures Act, supra note 15. See Legis. (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 912, 922;
HuBBARD, COTTO AND THE COTTON MARKET (2d ed. 1928) 213-215. Section 21 of this act
repealed the Cotton Futures Act enacted August 18, 1914, 38 STAT. 693 (1914), which had
been held unconstitutional by Judge Hough on the ground that it was a revenue measure,
and had originated in the Senate. Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 Fed. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
The act now in force levies a prohibitive tax of two cents a pound upon all future con-
tracts for the sale of cotton which do not conform to its provisions. Under the decision
in Hill v. Wallace, supra note 109, the constitutionality of the Cotton Futures Act is a
matter of doubt. Cf. Browne v. Thorne, supra note 22, at 139; Hutton v. Terrill, 255
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relation of this statute to state laws concerning speculation is of great
importance. As early as 1924 it was held by the Supreme Court of
Kansas that the Grain Futures Act supersedes state laws insofar as the
latter affect the validity of future contracts on exchanges which have
been designated "contract markets" by the Secretary of Agriculture.111
The same conclusion was subsequently reached by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit." 2 The Supreme Court of Ohio, however,
has held that state gambling laws remain unaffected by the federal
statute." 3
The Uhlmann Company relied upon the Grain Futures Act in estab-
lishing its case before the District Judge, but the latter held that the
Act did not cover "gambling" in futures, and that the Missouri law
governed. The Circuit Court of Appeals disapproved this determina-
tion, and expressed agreement with the decisions in Kansas and in the
Tenth Circuit. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis
stated, with reference to this question:
"The Grain Futures Act did not supersede any applicable provisions of the
Missouri law making gambling in grain futures illegal...
"The federal act declares that contracts for the future delivery of grain
shall be unlawful unless the prescribed conditions are complied with. It does
not provide that if these conditions have been complied with the contracts, or
the transactions out of which they arose, shall be valid. It does not purport
to validate any dealings. Nor is there any basis for the contention that Con-
gress occupied the field in respect to contracts for future delivery; and that
necessarily all state legislation in any way dealing with that subject is super-
seded. The purpose of the Grain Futures Act was to control the evils of
manipulation of prices in grain. Such manipulation, Congress found, was
Fed. 860 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) (holding that the Cotton Futures Act must be construed as
a revenue measure). Since the act primarily seeks to standardize price differences between
different grades of cotton, several state decisions holding that it does not supersede state
laws governing the validity of dealing in futures seem clearly correct. Arthur v. State,
supra note 104; Levi, Aronson & White v. Jones, 208 Ala. 104, 93 So. 733 (1922); cf.
Layton v. State, 165 Ga. 265, 140 S. E. 847 (1927). Under the Alabama statute regulating
future contracts, it is held that evidence that no delivery was made under a contract, and
that the dealings were on margin, makes out a prima facie case of illegality, which is re-
butted if it is shown that the contract met the requirements of the Cotton Futures Act.
T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Fenner & Beane, 221 Ala. 96, 127 So. 673 (1930); Fenner & Beane
v. Phillips, 222 Ala. 106, 130 So. 892 (1930); Fenner & Beane v. Olive, supra note 50.
111. State v. J. Rosenbaum Grain Co., 115 Kan. 40, 222 Pac. 80 (1924). Accord:
Goffe & Carkener v. Henneberger, 132 Kan. 211, 294 Pac. 672 (1931).
112. Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe & Carkener, supra note 47. Accord: Board of Trade
v. Gentry (W. D. Mo.) (unreported); cf. Hoyt v. Wickham, 25 F. (2d) 777, 779-80
(C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission,
13 F. (2d) 673, 685 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). In State v. Christopher, supra note 77, it was
held that the Grain Futures Act does not apply to transactions which do not take place
on "contract markets," even though a member of a "contract market" is a party to them.
113. C. A. King & Co. v. Horton, 116 Ohio St. 205, 156 N. E. 124 (1927).
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effected through dealings in grain futures. See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.
S. 1, 32. Many persons had advocated, as a remedy, that all future trading be
abolished. Congress took a less extreme position. It set up a system of
regulation and prohibited all future trading which did not comply with the
regulations prescribed. But it evinced no intention to authorize all future
trading if its regulations were complied with. Both the language of the Act
and its purpose are dear; and they indicate the contrary. The Missouri law
is in no way inconsistent with the provisions of the federal act. It does not
purport to legalize transactions which the federal act has made illegal. It does
not prescribe regulations for exchanges. Obviously, manipulation of prices
will not be made easier, or the prevention of such manipulation be made more
difficult, because the state has declared that certain dealings in futures are
illegal and has forbidden the maintenance within its borders of places where
they are carried on. Since there is nothing in the state law which is incon-
sistent with, or could conceivably interfere with the operation or enforcement
of, the federal law, the statute of Missouri was not superseded. Compare
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533." 114
Mr. Justice Butler, in his dissenting opinion, contented himself with
stating, somewhat enigmatically, that:
"I do not disagree with the majority that the Federal Grain Futures Act has
not superseded the statutes of Missouri applicable to these transactions." 115
The Grain Futures Act does not, either in its entitling or its general
content, purport to govern all sorts of transactions in grain. "Cash"
transactions, sales of actual grain for deferred delivery, and some trans-
actions negotiated off exchanges, are outside of its scope. Another federal
statute establishes official grain standards and provides for inspection.,,
The Grain Futures Act covers only future contracts in grain executed by
or through exchange brokers. Significant of its purpose is the declara-
tion that future contracts in grain are "affected with a national public
interest," that quotations of prices on exchanges are of importance to
producers and consumers and facilitate the movement of grain in inter-
state commerce, that future contracts are used as price insurance by
dealers and millers, and that regulation is imperative to prevent detri-
mental fluctuation in grain prices as a result of "speculation, manipula-
tion, or control." 117
The Act is so constructed that all future contracts in grain entered
114. See Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 1, at 198-200.
115. Id. at 206.
116. The Grain Standards Act, 39 STAT. 482 (1916), 7 U. S. C. § § 71-87 (1926); cf.
The Cotton Standards Act, 42 STAT. 1517 (1923), 7 U. S. C. § § 51-65 (1926). For a
forceful exposition of the view that the warehousing of grain in terminal markets is closely
related to future dealing and an integral part of the problem of control of exchanges, see
GOLDSTEN, op. cit. supra note 14, passim, especially 280.
117. Grain Futures Act, supra note 109, § 3.
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into on exchanges are brought under federal supervision. It is made a
misdemeanor to execute a future contract in grain except through a
member of an exchange which has been designated by the Secretary of
Agriculture as a "contract market," if such a contract "is or may be
used for (a) hedging any transaction in interstate commerce in grain
or the products or by-products thereof, or (b) determining the price
basis of any such transaction in interstate commerce, or (c) delivering
grain sold, shipped, or received in interstate commerce for the fulfillment
thereof... "118 The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to designate
an exchange as a "contract market" only when the exchange is "located
at a terminal market where cash grain of the kind specified in the con-
tracts of sale of grain for future delivery to be executed on such board
is sold in sufficient volumes and under such- conditions as fairly to
reflect the general value of the grain and the differences in value between
the various grades of grain... ," and when the governing board of the
exchange provides for the making of certain reports to the Secretary,
for the prevention of false market reports, manipulation and cornering,
and for the admission to membership of cooperative associations of pro-
ducers.119 Mechanism is provided for designations and suspension and
revocation of designations as "contract markets," and for the excluding
from the privilege of dealing on such markets of individuals who have
violated the Act.ls °
In considering the effect of this statute upon state statutes and rules
of decision governing speculation in grain, two distinct questions should
be considered: (1) does the Act legalize all contracts which comply
with the terms of the Act? (2) to what extent does the Act "occupy the




118. Id. § 4. The Act also permits "future contracts" where the seller is the owner or
grower of the actual grain which forms the subject-matter of the contract, or where
either party owns or rents the land on which the grain is to be grown. Contracts within
the permission of this section are not true future contracts, but mere "sales to arrive," or
"sales for deferred delivery." See note 9, supra.
119. Grain Futures Act, supra note 109, § 5. The constitutionality of the provisions re-
quiring reports to the Secretary of Agriculture has recently been upheld. Bartlett Frazier
Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert. den. by the Supreme Court, Octoler
9, 1933.
120. Id. § § 8, 9. A commission composed of the Attorney-General and the Secretaries
of Agriculture and Commerce is authorized to suspend exchanges from their designations
as "contract markets" in case they fail to comply with the Act. The commission's orders
are reviewable in the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit on October 31, 1933, set aside an order of this commission made in
1932 suspending the Chicago Board of Trade for sixty days. See Wash. Evening Star,
Oct. 31, 1933, at A-3.
121. The cases cited note 112, supra, hold that all contracts made through members
of contract markets and executed on contract markets are exempt from the operation of
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The first of these questions Mr. Justice Brandeis answered unquali-
fiedly in the negative. Despite the able opinion to the contrary of Judge
Burch of the Supreme Court of Kansas, 122 analysis of the provisions of
the Act undoubtedly supports the Justice's conclusion. The sole
requisite of validity for ordinary future contracts which the Act estab-
lishes is that they be "made by or through a member of a board of trade
which has been designated by the Secretary of Agriculture as a 'con-
tract market'... "1' It is plain that all future contracts on important
exchanges come within the sanction of this clause.124  But it is also clear
that many types of future contracts, distinct from orthodox speculation,
which courts and economists have been at one in condemning may also
be made through members of "contract markets." Contracts made
with the purpose of "cornering" the market are not only void on common-
law principles,'125 but are, undoubtedly, forbidden by the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.1 26  "Puts," "calls" and "straddles" 127 have long been
recognized as of doubtful legitimacy,'128 and have frequently been con-
demned by exchange rules. 1-2 9 The modern method of bucketing in-
volves contracts executed by or through members of "contract
markets." 130 The Act nowhere declares contracts of the foregoing type
invalid, and all come within the sanction of the "contract market" clause.
Yet it is unthinkable that Congress intended to legalize bucketing con-
state laws, and are enforceable if the terms of the Grain Futures Act have been complied
with. If this is sound, it follows that the Act determines the validity of all future con-
tracts, for it is declared to be unlawful to enter into future contracts which are not to be
executed in this manner.
122. State v. J. Rosenbaum Grain Co., supra note 111.
123. Grain Futures Act, supra note 109, § 4. See note 112, supra.
124. All important grain exchanges in the United States have been designated "contract
markets."
125. In re Chandler, supra note 14; Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145 (1869); Raymond
v. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447, 9 N. W. 525 (1881); Samuels v. Oliver, 130 Inl. 73, 22 N. E. 499
(1889).
126. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525 (1913).
127. For a brief description of these forms of trading, which are commonly referred
to as "indemnities," "privileges," or "options," see Legis. (1932) 45 HAxv. L. REv. 912, 921,
n. 41.
128. See IfL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 38, § 303; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1932) § §
13069-70; Lane v. Logan Grain Co., supra note 85. Section 3 of the Future Trading Act
subjected "options" to a prohibitive tax. See note 109, supra. This section of the Act was
held unconstitutional in Trusler v. Crooks, supra note 109. It has been said that "op-
tions" may "serve a legitimate purpose as insurance against fluctuations, but are com-
monly used by small speculators who cannot finance ordinary trading." Legis. (1932) 45
HARv. L. Ray. 912, 921, n. 41. The code submitted by the grain exchanges under the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act forbids all indemnities to endure longer than the closing
of the market the day following the sale of the indemnity. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1933,
at 4.
129. See (1930) REP. GRAIN FUTUREs AnDSm TRirx 14.
130. See note 104, sura.
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tracts, or cornering.13' There can be no doubt that Congress recognized
that to lay down a complete set of rules governing the validity of all
future contracts in grain would be a highly complex task; the Grain
Futures Act was not intended to serve any such purpose.
The extent to which the Act "occupies the field" is at once a more
significant and a more difficult question.13 2  The effect of federal statutes
on state laws in fields in which the federal and state governments possess
concurrent powers of legislation has proved to be a question in the de-
termination of which precedents are of little value. It is, however, well
settled that the mere fact of federal enactment in a concurrent field does
not necessarily involve supersession of all state legislation in that field. 33
Congress may "circumscribe its regulation and occupy a limited
field." '3' The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that a federal
statute will not be held to supersede existing state legislation unless
such intent on the part of Congress is clear.'35 But for all this, it is
beyond dispute that, where a federal enactment indicates a specific
purpose, or declares a definite policy, state statutes and rules of decision
which in any way tend to obstruct such a purpose or defeat such a policy
are superseded. 30
It is clear from the language, legislative history, and the subsequent
judicial interpretation of the Grain Futures Act that its purpose was to
enunciate the principle that dealings in grain futures on exchanges have
become of immense public importance, and to provide a mechanism for
the supervision of such dealings and for the prevention of abuses in
tradirig practices. These practices themselves are subjected to no legis-
lative condemnation; it is their abuse which it is the aim of the Act to
prevent. In many ways the Act must be regarded as recognizing the
131. The Congressional debates seem to demonstrate conclusively that the primary in-
tention of Congress was to prevent manipulation of prices by future trading "operations,"
62 CONG. REc. 9434, 12723. Apparently the authors of the bill felt that it neither legalized
nor illegalized speculation. Id. at 9404, 9434. Throughout the House debates it is clear
that no two Congressmen had the same conception of the meaning of "gambling" or "spec-
ulation," or of the distinction between the two. Id. at 9403-9450.
132. Upon this question the Congressional debates are not illuminating. Representative
Newton of Minnesota did state that the bill would annul state laws regulating grain futures,
and to this comment there was no rejoinder. 62 CONG. REc. 9429. There are some traces
of a specific intention to protect "hedging," but they are not convincing. Id. at 9404.
133. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 (1933); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California, 283 U. S. 380 (1931); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.
S. 118 (1919); Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912).
134. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, supra
note 133, at 392.
135. See cases cited note 133, supra.
136. This is so even where the federal statute does not completely "occupy the field"
if the state statute obstructs its operation within the limited field. See Willamette Iron
Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 10 (1888); Mintz v. Baldwin, 2 Fed. Supp. 700, 705
(N. D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd, 289 U. S. 346 (1933).
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necessity and desirability of orthodox trading in grain futures. It
recognizes the widespread use of exchange quotations in determining
the price of grain in contracts involving producers and consumers. It
recognizes the use of future contracts by millers and dealers to protect
themselves against loss through price fluctuation by "hedging." It
requires that "contract markets" conduct cash grain sales in sufficient
volume to reflect prices accurately, a provision which is obviously for
the purpose of promoting correlation between cash and future prices.
This correlation is essential to successful "hedging." 117
It seems to the writer that, if the Act is read with an eye to realities,
one must come to the conclusion that its effect is to sanction and to
protect from abuses ordinary speculation on exchanges. "Hedging" as
it is now carried on depends for its success upon the continuance of a
speculative market of some breadth. 13 Grain quotations are useless
as price determinants unless the speculation from which they arise is
of sufficient volume to reflect a concensus of informed opinion concern-
ing the value of grain. Certainly it was most infelicitous to describe
as "affected with a national public interest" a huge section of the na-
tion's business, if there was no intent to recognize that business as
legitimate so long as conducted free from the malpractices which it was
the purpose of the Act to prevent. The language and spirit of the Act
alike warrant the conclusion that its purpose is to regulate an important,
necessary and legitimate branch of national activity.1 9
137. See HUBBARD, op. cit. supra note 110, at 333-74; Legis. (1932) 45 HARv. 'L. REv.
912, 919, n. 31, 922, n. 47.
138. The precise extent to which "hedging" depends upon the coexistence of speculation
is a matter of some doubt. Mr. Hubbard has estimated that, in normal times, purely
speculative contracts comprise only some 25% of the total volume of trading on the
cotton futures market. HUBBARD, op. cit. supra note 110, at 322, 433. If "hedging"
really constitutes so large a fraction of the cotton futures market it may be that specula-
tion is not always essential to successful cotton "hedging." But Mr. Hubbard admits that
speculators frequently provide merchants with the means of shifting the risk of loss through
fluctuations in price. Id. at 311. It is probable that, in the grain market, the amount of
speculation relative to the total volume of market operations is higher than the estimate
given by Mr. Hubbard, and that "hedging" contracts alone would not supply a broad
enough market for "hedgers." Cf. Hor .Aw, op. cit. supra note 103; EimRY; HorrarMA",
both op. cit. supra note 17.
139. In view of the fact that the authors of the Grain Futures Act did not intend to
legalize "gambling" or "speculation," it may be urged that the Act should be so construed
as to leave the states free to impose such restrictions or prohibitions, in addition to those
established by the federal Act, as they see fit. To this argument two answers may be
given: (1) State statutes invalidating ordinary future contracts constitute a direct burden
on interstate commerce. It is true that the contrary should logically follow from a
decision of the Supreme Court upholding a state tax on the business of dealing in cotton
futures. Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405 (1908). But such a corollary
would seem to have been overruled by Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, supra note 109,
which accepts as the basis of decision the declarations in Section 3 of the Grain Futures
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If the above analysis of the scope of the Act is correct, the principles
upon which the second question should be answered are fairly clear.
State laws governing the legality of dealing in futures and the validity
of future contracts should not be held superseded by the federal Act as
long as they do not operate to obstruct and hinder orthodox speculation.
No doubt the states may still penalize bucket-shops and invalidate
bucketing contracts. Certainly contracts known to the parties to be
made with a view to "cornering" the market may be denied enforce-
ment. Probably the states may still forbid forms of future contracts
which are of doubtful utility and legitimacy, such as "puts" and "calls."
But statutes which, as construed by the courts, invalidate future con-
tracts merely because one or both of the parties intends to execute
counter-transactions should be held to be superseded by the Act, for
such statutes in effect penalize ordinary dealing in futures, invalidate
hedging, and obstruct the purpose of the federal statute. Were such
statutes completely enforced, no exchange would have dealings in suf-
ficient volume to reflect prices accurately. Hedging, in its present form,
would no longer be possible. And the abuses against which the Act is
directed would be much easier to perpetrate as a result of the infinitely
reduced volume of trading.
It is difficult to determine the precise extent to which the Uhlmann
case must be regarded as determinative of the foregoing questions. In
view of the rest of the decision, all that it was necessary to hold was that
the federal Act does not validate future contracts which are not made
on "contract markets." 140 It seems unfortunate that more than this was
said or implied without manifesting appreciation of the practical implica-
tions of the problem. The Missouri statute which was said to be in no
way superseded by the Grain Futures Act is an example of the numerous
state statutes declaring or reinforcing the common-law rule of "intent to
deliver" which, if enforced, would render speculation impossible, hedging
illegal, and subject all brokers to criminal liability. It is safe to say that
95% of the future contracts executed on the Kansas City Board of
Trade, which has been designated a "contract market," violate the Mis-
Act. Contra: Fenner v. Boykin, supra note 104. That the effective prohibition of "hedging"
would greatly hinder the business of merchants, millers, shippers and warehousemen of
grain there can be no doubt. The mere fact that no specified grain necessarily moves in
interstate commerce when a future contract is made does not mean that the making of
such contracts may not be essential to the moving of the grain crop as a whole. Even in
the absence of federal enactment the state gambling statutes as ordinarily construed should
be declared invalid, and the old decisions of the Supreme Court upholding such statutes
on the basis of the state's police power in local matters should be overruled. The grain
trade has outgrown them. (2) The proper functioning of the administrative machinery
established by the Act, and the Act's expressed purpose and tenor, should outweigh ex-
pressions of opinion in Congressional debates.
140. Such was the decision in State v. Christopher, supra note 77.
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souri statute, and that every broker in the state is a criminal under its
terms. Yet Mr. Justice Brandeis said that "there is nothing in the state
law which is inconsistent with, or could conceivably interfere with the
operation or enforcement of the federal law. .. "141 It is difficult to
conceive of a statute which would more completely thwart the purposes
of the Act than would the Missouri statute if enforced in all cases. It
is to be hoped that the final word on this question rem~dns to be spoken.
Conclusion
Analysis of the Supreme Court's determination of the Uhlmann case
leads to the conclusion that, in order to grasp its true importance, it is
necessary to look beyond the facts which have heretofore been con-
sidered legally significant. The apparent irrelevancy of many of the
circumstances which were emphasized and the utter impossibility of
establishing any logical relation between the factual premises and the
conclusions drawn therefrom alike suggest that new currents of thought
are flowing beneath the surface. Apparently it is from the facts detailed
in the opinion which, viewed in the perspective of established concepts,
seem most egregiously lacking in pertinency that the guiding considera-
tions may be discovered.
It may be illuminating, therefore, to return to Carrollton and Mc-
Donough's newly opened office in the basement of the Flowers Hotel.
Conceding all that economists have ever said in defense of speculation
as a part of our national business machinery, it cannot be denied that
that office was a plague and a pest to the community of Carrollton.
McDonough adopted aggressive tactics in persuading a class of people
whose capital was entirely inadequate to warrant their indulging in
speculation to become customers of the firm. One of the defendants was
induced to speculate although McDonough knew him to be already in
debt to the local bank.'42 Apparently very few of the Carrollton custo-
mers started to speculate on their own initiative. Their action was in
many instances due to prospects of "easy money" dangled before them
by the branch manager. 4 Few of them had had any experience in
dealing in grain or had access to the sort of information which is essential
if trading in futures is to be pursued on any basis more intelligent than
the turn of a coin. Some of them seem to have left the trading entirely
141. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., supra note 1, at 200. Mr. justice Brandeis'
traditional reluctance to find state action foreclosed by circumscribed 'federal legislation
in a concurrent field may explain his care to insert this elaborate dictum into the opinion.
Cf. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 33,
73-75.
142. Transcript of Record, 147-48.
143. See p. 63, supra.
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under McDonough's control.1 44 After initial losses occurred, the custo-
mers were egged on to continue speculating by renewed exhortations to
the effect that eventual profits were inevitable. 45 The president of the
Uhlmann Company flatly told several of the defendants that there would
be no further losses. 14
There can be little doubt that these factors weighed heavily in the
Court's determination of the case. The impecunious and inexperienced
character of the clientele, and the questionable tactics adopted by the
plaintiff ' certainly furnished strong moral and social grounds for refus-
ing to enforce the contracts made in the particular case. But if such
particular circumstances were indeed determinative, it is clear that pre-
existing criteria of the validity of future contracts have been largely
abandoned. On this new basis, it would seem that a court must inquire
thoroughly into the methods of obtaining business pursued by the
broker, the nature of the margin requirements, and the representations
made to the customers concerning the state and probable course of the
market, as well as considering carefully the financial status of the cus-
tomers and the extent of their experience with dealing in futures.
This new technique for determining the validity of future contracts
may be called the "standard of particular circumstances." It is clearly
a technique designed to achieve justice conceived in terms of particular
cases in litigation. In its favor, there can be no denying that to substi-
tute a flexible rule based upon the attitude which a court or a jury may
take toward the economic and moral factors involved in each case is a
distinct step forward. The test of "intent to deliver" stood in no in-
telligible relation to the problem whatsoever. Logically applied, it in-
validated all future contracts. As it worked out in practice, its effect
was hit-or-miss. The "standard of particular circumstances" at least
involves an attempt to evaluate and weigh the circumstances of each
case in terms of social and economic welfare.
Clearly, too, some steps must be taken for the protection of the
gullible and the inexperienced. The past eighty years have amply
demonstrated that the general public is easily enticed into the field of
144. Transcript of Record, 152-55.
145. Id. at 144, 147.
146. C. T. Dickson, a defendant, so testified. Id. at 160.
147. The reasons which prompted the Uhlmann Grain Company to invade Carrollton
are not difficult to surmise. The charge for providing main wires from exchanges to
distant cities is necessarily considerable, but telegraph companies will furnish "loops" off
the main wire to other points near the end at a comparatively small additional charge.
Thus firms maintaining wires from New York to Boston commonly maintain branch
offices on these "loops" at such cities as Lowell and Providence. There can be little doubt
that the Uhlmann Company put in the "loop" to Carrolton in the hope of defraying




speculation. Men need some organized restraint upon their tendency
to gamble as much as upon their inclination to drink. And brokers
stand in need of regulation of their dealings with the public as much as
do the merchants of securities. Both are fields in which the parties
cannot safely be left responsible only to the law of offer and acceptance
and their own consciences.
Yet, granting all this, the wisdom of regulating the methods of brokers
and penalizing aggressive practices by utilizing the power of a court to
refuse to enforce future contracts is doubtful. In the first place, ex-
perience has shown that it is highly ineffectual. People in general have
sufficient respect for the obligation of contracts, and enough sense of
shame in playing the "welcher" so that, by and large, they are reluctant
to interpose the plea of illegality. Brokers have in great measure
minimized the risk of repudiation by tightening up on their margin re-
quireme.nts and making discreet inquiries concerning the temperament of
their customers. It is possible that this has operated to shut out some
of those who have no business to speculate, but it is very doubtful if
such an effect has been marked. Meanwhile the volume of speculation
has increased apace, and the classes which engage in it have broadened
remarkably.
Furthermore, it is not good for the business morals of the community
to leave the sanction against ill-advised and eager trading practices to be
imposed by repudiation of contract obligations. It leaves a customer
who has good reason to feel that he has been unwarrantably dealt with
at peril of incurring scorn and reproach if he pursues the only avenue
of redress open to him. The benefits of the "standard of particular cir-
cumstances" would most often be received by those who least deserved
to benefit by it, and who would be most prone to fashion sham defenses.
It is undignified that those who do not regard their obligations should
be the guardians of the public welfare. Penalties against unfair broker-
age methods should be imposed by those who do not stand to profit by
the imposition.
Most important of all, however, is the complex nature of the problem.
If the "particular circumstances" are to be the test of legality, who is to
be the judge thereof? Is the jury to take all the factors into considera-
tion and determine whether the contracts in litigation were conscionable
or unconscionable? Is the judge to decide as a matter of law that, on
the basis of certain evidence if believed by the jury, the contracts are
valid, and on the basis of other evidence the contracts are' invalid?
Which of the numerous circumstances that have been suggested as
pertinent, such as solicitation, market representations, and financial
status of the customer, are to be decisive? Clearly the "standard of
particular circumstances" posits the development of a whole new body
of law. If the development of this field of the law is left wholly to the
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courts, it will be more decades before men can discover what contracts
are valid and why. In the meantime, the confusion and uncertainty
which now prevail will persist, and litigation will increase. Trial of the
cases will be even more protracted than it now is. Immense areas of
collateral fact will be opened up. Perjurious and sham defenses will be
encouraged. Plainly the standard is not one which the courts can develop
with facility.
These considerations suggest that regulations governing the relations
of commission brokers on exchanges with their customers and establish-
ing standards of proper dealing should be left to the legislatures to
formulate, and to administrative agencies to enforce. It is true that the
framing of these rules will be a complicated and difficult task. What
sort of penalities may most suitably be imposed is a question as yet
unanswered. It is possible that statutes requiring the licensing of all
commission brokers and providing for the making of reports covering
the occupations and resources of customers, and their volume of trading
and market experience would be the most feasible avenue of approach.
Such licenses could be subject to suspension where it appeared that the
broker was permitting his customers to trade out of all proportion to
their resources, or was inducing custom by representing the state of the
market in terms more colorful than cautious. Doing business without
a license might be made a criminal offense, and it might well be provided
that contracts made through an unlicensed broker should be void. Pos-
sibly solicitation of business should in itself be a ground for suspending
licenses. 48 Such provisions would be more flexible in application and
more easily enforced than statutes making the unfair trading practices
themselves criminal offenses. Any such solution of the problem neces-
sitates the creation of new administrative agencies, and the development
of new administrative technique. But if the exchanges themselves can-
not or will not effectively regulate the relations between broker and
customer, government control seems inescapable.
Insofar as the decision in the Uhlmann case may bring these and re-
lated problems to the attention of legislators and the legal profession, it
is to be welcomed. On the other hand, it is sufficiently clear that the
facts of the case were misconstrued. It is conceivable that such mis-
construction was a smoke-screen laid down in an effort to reach a result
which the Court felt imperative under the circumstances, and yet difficult
to achieve with due regard to precedent. The writer has sought to show
both that the same result could have been reached without such a
strained construction of the facts, and that the conception sub silentio
of an entirely new standard of legality was ill-advised. Apart from
either of these considerations, however, it is to be regretted that the
148. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 880; cf. Clark v. McNeill, 25 F. (2d) 247, 249 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1928).
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most probable effect of the decision will be to add confusion to uncer-
tainty. Far too many cases have already been decided by judges who
did not present an intelligible analysis of the test of "intent to deliver."
In the wide field of commercial dealings characterized as "speculative,"
certainty and predictability in applying the law are of prime importance.
The Ulzmann case does not help to clear the air.
